Tag: Economics

  • Tropical storms like Alberto can lead to years of declining incomes

    Tropical storms like Alberto can lead to years of declining incomes

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    Houses in Texas surrounded by floodwater from Tropical Storm Alberto in June 2024

    Brandon Bell/Getty

    Parts of Texas and Mexico were hit by flooding this week driven by Tropical Storm Alberto, the first named storm of what is forecast to be an extremely active Atlantic hurricane season. While overall damages weren’t especially severe, the long-term economic consequences from the storm and others like it could prove to be much more significant.

    “We’re learning more and more every year about the ways in which the scars of natural disasters and extreme climate events can be really persistent,” says Christopher…

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  • Extending the Sustainable Development Goals to 2050 — a road map

    Extending the Sustainable Development Goals to 2050 — a road map

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    The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) have been widely endorsed by governments, civil society and the private sector as a framework for creating a better world. Yet, as the 2030 deadline for achieving them looms, it is clear that most, if not all, will remain unmet. Most countries are way off track (see ‘Slow progress’); only a few targets, such as mobile broadband access and Internet use, are in reach1,2.

    This lag stems in part from the slowing of the global economy by shocks, including the COVID-19 pandemic and international conflicts, which weren’t anticipated in 2015 when the goals were agreed1,2. The goals require deep transformations in education, health, energy, land use, urban infrastructure and digital platforms, financed and implemented in an integrated manner3. Governments are struggling to fund long-term investments in infrastructure. And the sheer range of targets, across all sectors of the economy and at local, national, regional and global levels, challenges current modes of governance.

    SLOW PROGRESS: global map showing how far countries have progressed with the 17 SDG goals

    Source: Ref. 1

    There is insufficient finance to enable low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) to achieve the SDGs4. Many nations are in debt distress after the pandemic and face a tight schedule of repayments, which is setting back development. Weak domestic institutions and corruption5 further hamper the flow of equity and debt finance to LMICs.

    SDG actions, too, often remain siloed, and strategies unaligned. For example, as well as increasing spending on health, many COVID-19 recovery packages poured money into shoring up carbon-intensive industries rather than boosting renewables. Only a handful of countries’ climate commitments under the Paris agreement take into account broader SDG outcomes, including impacts on incomes, poverty, jobs, inequality, health and education6.

    Given all these constraints, some people have argued that the world should take stock and focus on fewer sustainability goals and targets. We disagree. Because all of these global crises are interlinked, only a holistic and global approach to solving them will work. The SDGs should remain at the centre of global policy agendas.

    Therefore, we call on member states of the United Nations, in the run-up to the UN Summit of the Future in September, to adapt and extend the SDG framework to 2050. This will entail setting interim targets for 2030 and 2040 and final targets for 2050 that align with science and maintain high, yet achievable, national and global ambitions.

    To support those discussions, here we highlight six priorities that we consider crucial, along with a schedule for action (see ‘Revised global actions and timelines’). Some goals can and should be met by 2030. Others will need more time and ambition, such as achieving net-zero carbon energy systems by 20507. The structures of international finance need to be reformed. And emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI) must be incorporated.

    Extend and bolster the framework

    Adapting the SDGs for 2050 will first require wide consultations, including with scientists, Indigenous populations, marginalized communities and the private sector. Inclusiveness is essential for maintaining the awareness and legitimacy that the framework enjoys today.

    All 2050 targets must be clear and measurable, using indicators that are widely accepted and easy to implement. For example, an effective climate-action goal (SDG 13) should be based on net-zero emissions of anthropogenic greenhouse gases by mid-century, as well as actionable climate-resilience goals.

    Cutting-edge technologies must be included. For example, AI could affect all the SDGs, both positively and negatively8. Global agreements on regulation will be needed, to stop the proliferation of AI-driven autonomous weapons, misinformation and inequalities.

    There are two ways to include AI — either by incorporating it into existing goals (such as SDG 9, on industry and innovation) or by adding a separate one. The 2020 Montreal Statement on Sustainability in the Digital Age (see go.nature.com/3yp6h1x) has laid the foundations for targets that ensure that AI technologies will be used for the shared prosperity of all.

    Measures of cross-border impacts, or spillovers, need to be better integrated into SDG targets, to ensure that progress in one region does not come at the expense of another1. Many high-income countries have practices that hinder SDG progress in LMICs, including importing goods that have environmental impacts overseas, supporting tax havens and the dumping of electronic and other wastes.

    Ensure a healthy planet

    The SDG agenda depends on and must ensure a safe operating space for humanity on Earth. A physically stable environment is a prerequisite for human well-being. Yet the world is transgressing six of nine planetary limits or ‘boundaries’ that regulate its stability and functioning9 — including in areas such as climate change, biodiversity and more. Surpassing these limits puts Earth’s entire life-support system at risk, and with it the chance to eradicate poverty and hunger and achieve good lives for all.

    Scientists must set out pathways for updating the SDG targets and milestones to return Earth to a safe operating zone within two decades. Global greenhouse-gas emissions must reach net zero by 2040–50. Global biodiversity loss must be halted in the next decade, and investments made to protect and regenerate intact and managed ecosystems. Patterns of resource extraction and use, covering everything from rare-earth metals to construction materials and nutrients, must shift towards circular models.

    A nurse cares for a child in its mother's arms at a clinic in the Foladi Valley near Bamian city, Afghanistan.

    A nurse examines a child in Afghanistan for malnutrition.Credit: Elise Blanchard/The Washington Post via Getty

    Strengthening global governance to achieve this transition will be challenging in the current geopolitical context. But the world has frameworks, agreed by all countries, that provide workable plans for accelerating and scaling sustainable transitions. These include, for example, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the UN Convention on Biological Diversity. The task is to shift the focus from negotiating over problems to delivering solutions, and to introduce strong enforcement mechanisms.

    All economic transactions need to account for the true cost of planetary damage. This requires a price on carbon, as well as tariffs on activities that undermine the functioning of ecosystems, freshwater cycles, marine systems and biochemical flows. The global financial system, starting with the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and regional development banks, needs to agree on universal principles for de-risking sustainable investments in LMICs, and putting an end to investments in planet-damaging operations.

    Enhance planning and cooperation

    Governments must extend their SDG policy pathways to mid-century and set mid-term milestones10. These plans should align national priorities with global objectives, ensuring that every country contributes to collective progress towards sustainable development.

    Governments should put in place dedicated and flexible systems to work across SDG priorities11, and build long-term, in-house knowledge rather than use consultants. They should strengthen their capacities to anticipate, adapt and learn about what works in and across organizations. They should design tools, institutions and partnerships to maximize public value, engage citizens and build and manage digital infrastructures that serve the common good2,11.

    Enhanced regional cooperation is also crucial, particularly in managing transnational infrastructure and rainforests, river basins, aquifers, coastal regions and fisheries. Transnational data sharing will be needed, through open-data initiatives for example.

    Address investment and finance

    Public investment must be scaled up and paced to meet the extended SDGs. This will involve financial commitments and strategic allocations that build complementarities across human capital, infrastructure, business capital and natural capital2,3. To deliver returns from business investment, for example, countries must ensure they have a skilled workforce — through universal access to quality education — and infrastructure for energy, water, transport, digital services and so on. In LMICs, investment in this crucial infrastructure has, until now, been underfunded2.

    Reform of the global financial architecture is crucial, as advocated by the UN secretary-general António Guterres and various economic blocs and institutions12. More accessible long-term, low-interest financing is needed for LMICs to pursue sustainable development. Multilateral development banks should boost their capital to increase the scope for financing. Regional financial architectures should be set up to support SDG-aligned projects across borders. Some regional development banks are taking steps to finance transboundary infrastructure, such as green power grids covering several countries.

    Governments can also encourage private financing by presenting their SDG investments in the context of clear integrated development strategies from now to mid-century.

    Adopt mission-based approaches

    Framing the fulfilment of SDGs through missions with well-defined goals — such as achieving energy systems with net-zero emissions, lessening health inequalities or closing the digital divide by a specific date — can be effective in helping to transform societal challenges into practical policy pathways. For example, one target of the European Union’s ‘Restore our Ocean and Waters’ mission is to reduce plastic litter at sea by at least 50% by 2030.

    Missions can bring together many sectors, technologies and types of firm to achieve ambitious goals13. For example, in its efforts to protect and restore marine and freshwater ecosystems in Europe, the European Commission has convened 13 of its ministries (or directorates-general) — including those responsible for climate action, maritime affairs and fisheries, and research and innovation, to tackle the mission in a whole-of-government way.

    A worker takes care of mangrove tree seedlings to be planted against drought in Basra city, southern Iraq.

    Mangrove plants are being planted near Basra in southern Iraq to help to tackle climate change.Credit: Haidar Mohammed Ali/Anadolu via Getty

    And missions can act as multipliers for investment outcomes; jobs, productivity and growth can result, strengthening their political traction. More than 480 innovation projects and €3.7 billion (US$4 billion) in public and private investment have been mobilized for the EU’s oceans and waters mission since 2021, for example. A ‘digital twin’ of the region’s oceans and fresh water is being created to monitor and evaluate progress for this mission, and will benefit policymakers, citizens, entrepreneurs and scientists.

    Spin-offs can result, which are not captured by conventional cost-benefit analyses. For example, NASA’s Apollo missions led to camera phones, foil blankets and formula milk. Governments will need to develop dynamic methodologies to quantify these multiplicative effects.

    Multilateral and national development banks can also be aligned around deep transformation pathways and innovative missions14,15. For example, Germany’s green steel sector owes its growth to the KfW Development Bank’s green loans programme for heavy industry, which aligned its long-term and low-interest finance to the government’s energy transition mission16.

    Foster change and accountability

    Although some high-income countries, such as some in the EU, have made progress towards the SDGs, they must continue to support worldwide efforts. Vulnerabilities of nations that are especially exposed to climate-change impacts, including small island states, must be addressed. Financial support should be provided, ranging from direct cash payments to climate-resilient debt clauses. Human capacity building should be driven by the nations’ adaptation needs and capacities, diverse ecosystems and socio-economic settings.

    Accountability mechanisms are currently scattered and irregular, and must be strengthened. These include regular follow-up, transparent reporting and systems to hold actors accountable for missed targets, at local, national and global levels. Peer review, in which countries review each other’s performances, could be considered, as well as recognition and rewards for the best perfomers. New tools to make the SDGs more politically important to governments are urgently needed2.

    A new economics of the common good is needed, too — for setting shared goals and working out how to achieve them17. This involves cross-cultural respect and cooperation, the cultivation of civic virtues and defending the dignity of the socially, politically and economically marginalized — with not just words but also policies and collaborations involving government, business, workers and civil society. Diverse voices and sources of knowledge must be brought to the table to discuss what it means to co-create a just and sustainable economy.

    What next?

    We recommend that at the Summit of the Future, UN member states resolve that an updated and reinvigorated SDG framework should guide national action and global cooperation until 2050. We suggest that they set up an inter-agency, multicountry working group to develop the details.

    These guidelines would be adopted by the UN General Assembly by 2026. And, no later than 2027, all nations should prepare revised, comprehensive and forward-looking voluntary national reviews of SDG strategies, incorporating ambitious targets for 2030, 2040 and 2050. These reviews would feature long-term transformation pathways and mission-based strategies, and include cooperation mechanisms to support LMICs.

    In addition, we suggest the following actions in support of the SDGs.

    Regarding planetary health, UN member states should establish a global governance mechanism to address planetary stability and security, with a focus on the risks of exceeding planetary boundaries that will lead to unmanageable and irreversible intergenerational damage to life-support systems.

    Regarding financing, member states should agree to adopt the SDG Stimulus programme (see go.nature.com/3vvbppf) to bolster official financing and debt relief. In addition, a reformed global financial architecture, including global taxation on fossil-fuel emissions, air travel, shipping and international financial transactions, should be adopted at the Financing for Development Summit in 2025.

    Regarding policy support and cooperation, the whole UN system should work to ensure policy and financial coherence with the SDG agenda. Regional bodies (such as the African Union, EU, Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the South American trade body Mercosur, the Eurasian Economic Union and others) should work to reinforce cooperation and regional-scale investments in transboundary infrastructure and environmental protection.

    Regarding capabilities, UN member states should adopt a balanced and multilateral knowledge-based approach to the SDGs framework. Publicly funded research systems should be deployed, nationally and globally, encompassing social and technological innovation and the evaluation of interventions.

    By embracing this comprehensive approach, the global community can ensure sustainable development for all by mid-century, leaving no one behind.

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  • the researcher’s guide to financial management

    the researcher’s guide to financial management

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    Four glass test tubes in a test tube holder with rolled up US bank notes inside

    It helps to mix science and savings when it comes to lab financial management.Credit: Getty

    For Michael Monaghan, the road to better laboratory finances came with breaking down walls — literally. When faced with the costly challenge of securing microscope access, Monaghan, a biomedical engineer at Trinity College Dublin, had to get creative.

    “The equipment was housed in an isolated quarter and its deconstruction and recalibration would be too costly,” he says. “In the end, we got approval to break down the wall of the microscope room, allowing us to reconfigure the building’s boundaries. By thinking outside the box, we killed two birds with one stone — we got the microscope, and the total cost was only 10% of the predicted relocation fee.”

    Lab financial management has perhaps never been more important. The COVID-19 pandemic paired with a slowing world economy have led to budgets being cut globally. During this year alone, the South Korean government has announced a 14.7% reduction in research expenditure, US science agencies are predicted to miss research-spending goals by as much as US$7 billion and the European Union’s flagship science programme, Horizon Europe, is set to lose €2.1 billion ($2.28 billion) of its €95.5-billion budget.

    Alongside this, supply-chain disruptions and increasing energy prices are adding to the rising tide of research expenses. The price of scientific equipment has also been driven higher by inflation, while research grants have seen little increment.

    Despite these circumstances, financial training for junior lab members is still scarce. “I wish I had received more formal training on how to financially manage a lab when I was a research trainee,” says Kaitlyn Sadtler, an immunoengineering researcher at the National Institutes of Health in Bethesda, Maryland. Nature spoke to researchers about their budget tips. Here’s their advice.

    Build a culture of trust

    Sadtler was exposed to two financial-management styles during her time as an early-career researcher. Her PhD lab had a culture of responsible spending, managed by her principal investigator, whereas in her postdoctoral lab, each member was allocated a fixed monthly budget to spend. When starting her own lab, Sadtler gravitated towards the first management style, while integrating extra checks and balances.

    “At the start of each fiscal year I would gather my lab members to discuss our funds and ongoing projects,” she says. “I find that such a meeting creates a collective sense of ownership, which fosters a culture of responsible spending.”

    A lab worker carrying many bottles of red cell culture media past lab freezers and airducts

    A member of Michael Monaghan’s lab bulking up on cell-culture media.

    However, to make sure that the trust she gives lab members is not exploited and there are funds for rainy days, Sadtler also maintains a carefully monitored spreadsheet containing the spending of each lab member so that the flow of funds is clear. She also slightly overestimates her lab’s spending, to have funds for emergencies or wish-list items. “By the start of the next fiscal year, my lab will calculate how much we have left and allocate the extra funds to our wish-list experiments,” she says. “An example would be single-cell RNA sequencing, which can cost upwards of $1,000 per sample. It was this experiment which helped us to kick start a new study in our lab last year.”

    Negotiate discounts and buy in bulk

    Negotiation is another important but overlooked skill for lab-budget management, according to Monaghan. His lab regularly orders cell-culture media in bulk, so he can often negotiate discounts of 20–50%. Buying in bulk also comes with other benefits: larger purchases are often prioritized for shipment, and delivery fees — which are calculated on how many items are ordered, not the total weight — are reduced. This process, Monaghan says, also builds a closer relationship with sales representatives, leading to improved technical support and product introduction.

    There is also the shopping trend known as group buying, in which researchers place a shared order with the same company. This enables negotiation for better prices and improves the chances of priority shipping. However, Monaghan warns that “bureaucratic policies in institutions can add time to [this process], possibly negating the savings benefits”.

    The geographical location of a lab also plays a part in spending decisions, says Jeremy Teo, an assistant professor at New York University Abu Dhabi in the United Arab Emirates. “In Abu Dhabi, shipping of chemical and biological materials can take up to three times longer than in the United States, and items might also be transported in non-optimal conditions. Therefore, if the items can be preserved, we try to spend as early as we can to prevent delays.” Teo adds that his lab tends to purchase items in bulk during the winter season, when the weather is cooler, because the extreme heat of the Abu Dhabi summer can damage biological materials en route.

    Make it a team effort

    Because the day-to-day responsibilities of an investigator can be overwhelming, lab members and institutional staff should be on hand to offer help. “Managing finances is a team effort and bringing experienced staff on board can be useful,” says Sadtler. “One of my technicians is supporting me with lab finances and, because she already has experience handling budgets, she is able to recognize when items are more expensive than they should be and how to get bundle deals.”

    Institutions can provide another source of support and junior investigators should consider attending orientations regarding handling finances, reading handbooks and seeking advice from senior investigators. Sadtler also attends monthly meetings with administrative and budget-management staff at her institution to discuss lab expenditures, including spending projections and updates on expiring funds. “This has helped me to stay updated on how my lab is doing financially and to spend funds in a timely manner,” she says.

    Teo says that, when he started his assistant professorship, he did not pay attention to e-mails or institutional policies on research spending and only later learnt that he was unable to carry funds forward to the next financial cycle. “Every mistake is a good lesson. I highly advise all new investigators to read e-mails from the finance office and create calendar reminders.”

    Learn money management early

    “Financial-management skills are not only important for principal investigators, but also for researchers interested in entering different industries,” says Gordon Xiong, assistant director at the Singapore Health Technologies Consortium. “For instance, project managers are often expected to organize timely deliverables and control budgetary spending for institutional and industry-sponsored projects. To prepare researchers for these positions, early exposure to financial and project management is key.”

    Like most scientists, Xiong learnt budgetary management on the job, while assisting his PhD supervisor with grant applications (see ‘Tips for lab budgeting’) . A postdoctoral stint gave him an opportunity to be a co-investigator on several projects and allowed him to hone his skills further. Today, he manages a programme that at one time was giving out seed funding to university researchers. “Most PhD graduates would have completed multi-year experimental projects, which means employers are confident in their technical and analytical skills. However, to build the financial skills that are also valued in the industry, it’s useful to get involved in managing project budgets early on,” he says.

    Sadtler says that, although there is no formal financial-management training programme at her institution, she mentors her students during the grant-writing process. “Getting competing quotes from vendors for large value items and learning how much to budget for personnel prepares my students for future leadership responsibilities.”

    Monaghan has supported his students during fellowship applications when they had to budget for expenditures such as salary, materials costs and travel expenses. “Although there are no formal training programmes, mentors can provide informal learning experiences for their students. When my postdocs apply for fellowships, I scrutinize their budget sections carefully, because grantors look for realistic budgeting skills in research trainees. Through this, a few of my postdocs have successfully received fellowships.”

    Tips for lab budgeting

    Use institutional resources. Ask your institution for support and see what it has to offer. This might include grant-monitoring software, free online videos or training support from its finance departments.

    Create a spreadsheet to monitor spending. Having a shareable spreadsheet can help to organize lab inventory and track project costs.

    Get your hands on example budgets. Having a reference budget is a helpful guide to navigating personnel costs, equipment, recurring fees and experimental materials. It is advisable to obtain recent examples from grantors or colleagues from a similar field for relevance.

    Seek advice from senior colleagues. Senior researchers can provide mentoring by sharing their experiences, including negotiating discounts with vendors and navigating budgetary increases such as pay rises. Research trainees can also request training from their supervisors during fellowship applications and grant writing.

    Try to negotiate. Negotiation with vendors, service providers and publishers can help to build relationships and save money for labs. Examples include negotiating for free samples, especially when buying in bulk or during a group order, postponement in payments and discounts for open-access fees.

    Build a team culture. Every member in the lab can help with optimizing lab spending and budget planning. They can purchase in bundles to reduce shipping costs, share lab supplies and minimize reagent-expiration costs. Lab heads and managers should try to cultivate a culture of responsible spending and teamwork.

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  • Hybrid working from home improves retention without damaging performance

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    Location and set-up

    Our experiment took place at Trip.com in Shanghai, China. In July 2021, Trip.com decided to evaluate hybrid WFH after seeing its popularity amongst US tech firms. The first step took place on 27 July 2021, when the firm surveyed 1,612 eligible engineers, marketing and finance employees in the Airfare and IT divisions about the option of hybrid WFH. They excluded interns and rookies who were in probation periods because on-site learning and mentoring are particularly important for those individuals. Trip.com chose these two divisions as representative of the firm, with a mix of employee types to assess any potentially heterogeneous impacts. About half of the employees in these divisions are technical employees, writing software code for the website, and front-end or back-end operating systems. The remainder work in business development, with tasks such as talking to airlines, travel agents or vendors to develop new services and products; in market planning and executing advertising and marketing campaigns; and in business services, dealing with a range of financial, regulatory and strategy issues. Across these groups, 395 individuals were managers and 1,217 non-managers, providing a large enough sample of both groups to evaluate their response to hybrid WFH.

    Randomization

    The employees were sent an email outlining how the six-month experiment offered them the option (but not the obligation) to WFH on Wednesday and Friday. After the initial email and two follow-up reminders, a group of 518 employees volunteered. The firm randomized employees with odd birthdays—those born on the first, third, fifth and so on of the month—into eligibility for the hybrid WFH scheme starting on the week of 9 August. Those with even birthdays—born on the second, fourth, sixth and so on of the month—were not eligible, so formed the control group.

    The top management at the firm was surprised at the low volunteer rate for the optional hybrid WFH scheme. They suspected that many employees were hesitating because of concerns that volunteering would be seen as a negative signal of ambition and productivity. This is not unreasonable. For example, a previous study28 found in the US firm they evaluated that WFH employees were negatively selected on productivity. So, on 6 September, all of the remaining 1,094 non-volunteer employees were told that they were also included in the program. The odd-birthday employees were again randomized into the hybrid WFH treatment and began the experiment on the week of 13 September. In this paper we analyse the two groups together, but examining the volunteer and non-volunteer groups individually yields similar findings of reduced quit rates and no impact on performance.

    Employee characteristics and balancing tests

    Figure 1 shows some pictures of employees working in the office (left side). Employees all worked in modern open-plan offices in desk groupings of four or six colleagues from the same team. By contrast, when WFH, they usually worked alone in their apartments, typically in the living room or kitchen (see Extended Data Fig. 2).

    The individuals in the experimental sample are typically in their mid-30s. About two-thirds are male, all of them have a university undergraduate degree and almost one-third have a graduate degree (typically a master’s degree). In addition, nearly half of the employees have children (details in Extended Data Table 1).

    In Extended Data Table 7 we confirm that this sample is also balanced across the treatment and control groups, by conducting a two-sample t-test. The exceptions are from random variation given that the sampling was by even or odd day-of-month birthday—the control sample is 0.5 years older (P = 0.06), and this is presumably linked to why those in this group have 0.06% more children (P = 0.02) and 0.4 years more tenure (P = 0.09).

    In Extended Data Table 3, we examine the decision to volunteer for the WFH experiment. We see that volunteers were significantly less likely to be managers (meannon-volunteer = 0.28, meanvolunteer = 0.17, t(1610) = −4.85, P < 0.001) and had longer commute times (hours) (meannon-volunteer = 0.80, meanvolunteer = 0.89, t(1257) = 3.68, P < 0.001). Notably, we don’t find evidence of a relationship between volunteering and previous performance scores (meannon-volunteer = 3.81, meanvolunteer = 3.81, t(1580) = −0.02, P = 0.985), highlighting, at least in this case, the lack of evidence for any negative (or positive) selection effects around WFH.

    Extended Data Fig. 3 plots the take-up rates of WFH on Wednesday and Friday by volunteer and non-volunteer groups. We see a few notable facts. First, take-up overall was about 55% for volunteers and 40% for non-volunteers, indicating that both groups tended to WFH only one day, typically Friday, each week. At Trip.com, large meetings and product launches often happen mid-week, so Fridays are seen as a better day to WFH. Second, the take-up rate even for non-volunteers was 40%, indicating that Trip.com’s suspicion that many employees did not volunteer out of fear of negative signalling was well-founded, and highlighting that amenities like WFH, holiday, maternity or paternity leave might need to be mandatory to ensure reasonable take-up rates. Third, take-up surged on Fridays before major holidays. Many employees returned to their home towns, using their WFH day to travel home on the quieter Thursday evening or Friday morning. Finally, take-up rates jumped for both treatment-group and control-group employees in late January 2022 after a case of COVID in the Shanghai headquarters. Trip.com allowed all employees at that point to WFH, so the experiment effectively ended early on Friday 21 January. The measure of an employee’s daily WFH take-up excludes leave, sick leave or occasions when they cannot come to the office owing to extreme bad weather (typhoon) or to the COVID outbreak in the company.

    Null results

    To interpret the main null results, we conduct null equivalence tests using the two one-sided tests (TOST) procedure in R (refs. 29,30). This test required us to specify the smallest effect size of interest (SESOI). For the results pertaining to performance review measures, we use 0.5 as the SESOI. This corresponds to half of a consecutive letter grade increase or decrease, because we had assigned numeric values to performance letter grades in increments of 1, with the lowest letter grade D being 1, and the highest letter grade A being 5. We performed equivalence tests for a two-sample Welch’s t-test using equivalence bounds of ±0.5. The TOST procedure yielded significant results using the default alpha of 0.05 for the tests against both the upper and the lower equivalence bounds for the performance measures for July–December 2021 (t(1504) = −10.20, P < 0.001)), January–June 2022 (t(1353) = −10.57, P < 0.001)), July–December 2022 (t(1299) = 10.34, P < 0.001)) and January–June 2023 (t(1248) = −8.80, P < 0.001)). The equivalence test is therefore significant, which means we can reject the hypothesis that the true effect of the treatment on performance is larger than 0.5 or smaller than −0.5. So, we interpret the performance effects of the treatment to be actually null on the basis of the SESOI we used, as opposed to no evidence of a difference in performance.

    We conducted null equivalence results for the effect of the treatment on promotions using 2 as the SESOI, corresponding to ±2 percentage points (pp) difference in promotion rates. Although we can reject the null hypothesis that the true effect of treatment on promotion is larger than 2 pp or smaller than −2 pp in January–June 2022 (t(1376) = −2.22, P = 0.013) and July–December 2022 (t(1306) = 1.33, P = 0.092), we fail to reject the null equivalence hypothesis in July–December 2021 (t(1513) = 0.83, P = 0.203) and January–June 2023 (t(1250) = 0.98, P = 0.163). Thus, we interpret the results on promotion as no evidence of a difference between promotion rates across treatment and control employees.

    We also conducted the equivalence test for lines of code using 29 lines of code per day as the SESOI, which corresponds to 10% of the mean number of lines of code for the control group. We arrive at this SESOI on the basis of rounding down the productivity effects of previous findings8,10. We can reject the equivalence null hypothesis for lines of code (t(92362) = −2.74, P = 0.003)) so we interpret the effect of the treatment as a null effect.

    Volunteer versus non-volunteer groups

    In the main paper we pool the volunteer and non-volunteer groups. In Extended Data Table 5 we examine the impacts on performance and promotions and we see no evidence of a difference in performance and promotion treatment effects for volunteer versus non-volunteer groups (column 9).

    Performance subcategories

    The company has a rigorous performance-reviewing process every six months that determines employees’ pay and promotion, so is carefully conducted. The review process for each employee is built on formal reviews provided by their managers, project leaders and sometimes co-workers (peer review). Managers are more like an employee’s direct managers for organizational purposes, but for a particular project, the project leader could be another higher-level employee. In such a case, the manager of the employee would ask that project leader for an opinion on the employee’s contribution to the project. An individual’s overall score is a weighted sum of scores from various subcategories that managers have broad flexibility over defining, because tasks differ across employees, and managers would give a score for each task. For example, an employee running a team themselves will have subcategories around developing their direct reports (leadership and communication), whereas an employee running a server network will have subcategories around efficiency and execution. The performance subcategory data come from the text of the performance review. We first used the most popular Chinese word segmentation package in Python, named Jieba, to identify the most frequent Chinese words from task titles across four performance reviews. We also removed meaningless words and incorporated common expressions such as key performance indicators (‘KPI’), objectives and key results (‘OKR’), ‘rate’ and ‘%’. This process resulted in a total of 236 unique words and expressions. We then manually categorized those most frequent keywords into nine major subcategories (see below) by meanings and relevance. Finally, on the basis of the presence of keywords in the task title, tasks were grouped into the following subcategories:

    • Communication tasks are those that involve communication, collaboration, cooperation, coordination, participation, suggestion, assistance, organization, sharing and relationships.

    • Development tasks are those that involve coding or codes, data or datasets, systems, techniques and skills.

    • Efficiency tasks are those that involve cost reduction, ratios, return on investment (ROI), rate, %, improvement, growth, lifting, adding, optimizing, profit, receiving, gross merchandise value (GMV), OKR, KPI, work and goal.

    • Execution tasks are those that involve execution, conducting, maintenance, delivery, output, quality, contribution and workload.

    • Innovation tasks are those that involve development, R&D and innovation.

    • Leadership tasks are those that involve leadership, managing or management, approval, internal, strategy, coordination and planning.

    • Learning tasks are those that involve learning, growing, maturing, talent, ability, value competitiveness and personal improvement.

    • Project tasks are those that involve project, supply, product, business line, cooperation and clients.

    • Risk tasks are those that involve risk, compliance, supervision, recording and monitoring, safety, rules and privacy.

    Data sources

    Data were provided by a combination of Trip.com sources, including human resources records, performance reviews and two surveys. All data were anonymized and coded using a scrambled individual ID code, so no personally identifiable information was shared with the Stanford team. The data were drawn directly from the Trip.com administrative data systems on a monthly basis. Gender is collected by Trip.com from employees when they join the company.

    Subsamples

    The full sample has 1,612 experiment participants, but we have 1,507, 1,355, 1,301 and 1,254 employees, respectively, in the subsamples for the four performance reviews from July–December 2021, January–June 2022, July–December 2022 and January–June 2023. These smaller samples are due to attrition. In addition, for the first performance review in July–December 2021, 105 employees did not have sufficient pre-experiment tenure to support a performance review (they had joined the firm less than three months before the experimental draw). The review text data covers 1,507,1,339,1,290 and 1,246 people, as some employees do have an overall score and review text but do not have additional and task-specific scores. The reason is that these employees do not have the full range of all tasks, so their managers did not write the full review script. For the two surveys, Trip.com used Starbucks vouchers to incentivize response and collected responses from 1,315 employees (314 managers, 1,001 non-managers) at the baseline on the left, and that of 1,345 employees (324 managers, 1,021 non-managers) at the end line.

    Testings

    All tests used two-sided Student t-tests unless otherwise stated. Analysis was run on Stata v17 and v18, R version 4.2.2. Unless stated otherwise, no additional covariates are included in the tests. The null hypothesis for all of the tests excluding null equivalence tests is a coefficient of zero (for example, zero difference between treatment and control).

    Inclusion and ethics statement

    The design and execution of the experiment was run by Trip.com. No participants were forced to WFH owing to the experiment (the entire firm was, however, forced to WFH during the pandemic lockdown). The treatment sample had the option but not the obligation to WFH on Wednesday or Friday. The experiment was designed, initiated and run by Trip.com. N.B. and R.H. were invited to analyse the data from the experiment, with consent for data collection coming from Trip.com internally. The experiment was exempt under institutional review board (IRB) approval guidelines because it was designed and initiated by Trip.com, before N.B. and R.H. were invited to analyse the data. Only anonymous data were shared with the Stanford team. Trip.com based the experimental design and execution on their previous experience with WFH randomized control trials17.

    Reporting summary

    Further information on research design is available in the Nature Portfolio Reporting Summary linked to this article.

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  • Companies inadvertently fund online misinformation despite consumer backlash

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    Background on digital advertising

    The predominant business model of several mainstream digital media platforms relies on monetizing attention via advertising3. While these platforms typically offer free content and services to individual consumers, they generate revenue by serving as an intermediary or advertising exchange connecting advertisers with independent websites that want to host advertisements. To do so, platforms run online auctions to algorithmically distribute advertising across websites, known as ‘programmatic advertising’. For example, Google distributes advertising in this manner to more than two million non-Google sites that are part of the Google Display Network. This allows websites to generate revenue for hosting advertising, and they share a percentage of this payment with the platform. In the USA, more than 80% of digital display advertisements are placed programmatically16. We refer to these advertising exchanges as digital advertising platforms and use the term digital platforms to collectively refer to all the services offered by such media platforms.

    We examine the role of advertising companies and digital advertising platforms in monetizing online misinformation. While in other forms of (offline) media, advertisers typically have substantial control over where their advertisements appear, advertising placement through digital advertising platforms is mainly automated. Since most companies do not have the capacity to participate in high-frequency advertising auctions that require them to place individual bids for each advertising slot they are interested in, they typically outsource the bidding process to an advertising platform. Such programmatic advertising gives companies relatively less control over where their advertisements end up online. However, companies can take steps to reduce advertising on misinformation websites, such as by only being part of advertising auctions for a select list of credible websites or blocking advertisements from appearing on specific misinformation outlets.

    Collecting website data

    We collect data on misinformation websites in three steps. First, we use a dataset maintained by NewsGuard. This company rates all the news and information websites that account for 95% of online engagement in each of the five countries where it operates. Journalists and experienced editors manually generate these ratings by reviewing news and information websites according to nine apolitical journalistic criteria. Recent research has used this dataset to identify misinformation websites6,66,67. In this paper, we consider each website that NewsGuard rates as repeatedly publishing false content between 2019 and 2021 to be a misinformation website and all others to be non-misinformation websites, leading to a set of 1,546 misinformation websites and 6,499 non-misinformation websites. To get coverage throughout our study period, we sample websites provided by NewsGuard from the start, middle and end of each year from 2019 to 2021. Additionally, we also sample websites from January 2022 and June 2022 to account for websites that may have existed during our study period and discovered later. Supplementary Table 3 summarizes the characteristics of this dataset. Our NewsGuard dataset contains websites across the political spectrum, including left-leaning websites (for example, https://www.palmerreport.com/ and https://occupydemocrats.com/), politically neutral websites (for example, https://rt.com/ and https://www.nationalenquirer.com), and right-leaning websites (for example, https://www.thegatewaypundit.com/ and http://theconservativetreehouse.com/).

    Note that prior research that has used the NewsGuard dataset has often used the term ‘untrustworthy’ to describe websites6,67. Such research has used NewsGuard’s aggregate classification whereby a site that scores below a certain threshold (60 points) on NewsGuard’s weighted score system is labelled as untrustworthy. Instead of using NewsGuard’s overall score for a website, we use the first criterion classified by NewsGuard for each website—that is, whether a website repeatedly publishes false news to identify a set of 1,546 misinformation websites. While 94% of the NewsGuard misinformation websites we identify in this manner are also untrustworthy based on NewsGuard’s classification, only about 52% of the untrustworthy websites are misinformation websites or websites that repeatedly publish false news. Our measure of misinformation is, therefore, more conservative than prior work using NewsGuard’s ‘untrustworthy’ label.

    In addition to the NewsGuard dataset, we use a list of websites provided by the GDI. This non-profit organization identifies disinformation by analysing both the content and context of a message, and how they are spread through networks and across platforms68. In this way, GDI maintains a list of monthly-updated websites, which it also shares with interested advertising tech platforms to help reduce advertising on misinformation websites. The GDI list allows us to identify 1,869 additional misinformation websites. Finally, we augment our list of misinformation websites with 396 additional ones used in prior work69,70. Among the websites that NewsGuard rated as non-misinformation (at any point in our sample), 310 websites were considered to be misinformation websites by our other sources or by NewsGuard itself (during a different period in our sample). We categorize these websites as misinformation websites given their risk of producing misinformation.

    Altogether, our website dataset consists of 10,310 websites, including 3,811 misinformation and 6,499 non-misinformation websites. Similar to prior work6,67, our final measure of misinformation is at the level of the website or online news outlet. Aggregating article-level information and using website-level metadata is meaningful since it reduces noise when arriving at a website-level measure. Finally, we use data from SEMRush, a leading online analytics platform, to determine the level of monthly traffic received by each website from 2019 to 2021.

    Consumer experiment design

    This study was reviewed by the Stanford University Institutional Review Board (Protocol No. IRB-63897) and the Carnegie Mellon University Institutional Review Board (protocol no. IRB00000603). Our study was pre-registered at the American Economic Association’s Registry under AEARCTR-0009973. Informed consent was obtained from all participants at the beginning of the survey.

    Setting and sample recruitment

    We recruited a sample of US internet users via CloudResearch. CloudResearch screened respondents for our study so that they are representative of the US population in terms of age, gender and race based on the US Census (2020). It is important to note that while we recruited our sample to be representative on these dimensions to improve the generalizability and external validity of our results, our sample is a diverse sample of US internet users, which is not necessarily representative of the US population on other dimensions71. To ensure data quality, we include a screener in our survey to check whether participants pay attention to the information provided. Only participants who pass this screener can proceed with the survey. Our total sample includes 4,039 participants, who are randomized into five groups approximately evenly.

    The flow of the survey study is shown in Supplementary Fig. 1. We begin by asking participants to report demographics such as age, gender and residence. From a list of trustworthy and misinformation outlets, we then ask participants questions about their behaviours in terms of the news outlets they have used in the past 12 months, their trust in the media (on a 5-point scale), the online services or platforms they have used and the number of petitions they have signed in the past 12 months.

    Initial gift card preferences

    We then inform participants that one in five (that is, 20% of all respondents) who complete the survey will be offered a US$25 gift card from a company of their choice out of six company options. Respondents are asked to rank the six gift card companies on a scale from their first choice (most preferred) to their sixth choice (least preferred). These six companies belong to one of three categories: fast food, food delivery and ride-sharing. All six companies appeared on the misinformation websites in our sample during the past three years (2019–2021), offer items below US$25, and are commonly used throughout the USA. The order in which the six companies are presented is randomized at the respondent level. As a robustness check, we also ask respondents to assign weights to each of the six gift card options. This question gives respondents greater flexibility by allowing them to indicate the possibility of indifference (that is, equal weights) between any set of options. We then ask participants to confirm which gift card they would like to receive if they are selected to ensure they have consistent preferences regardless of how the question is asked. At this initial elicitation stage, the respondents did not know that they will get another chance to revise their choice. Hence, these choices can be thought of as capturing their revealed preference.

    Information treatments

    All participants in the experiment are given baseline information on misinformation and advertising. This is meant to ensure that all participants in our experiment are made aware of how we define misinformation along with examples of a few misinformation websites (including right-wing, neutral and left-wing misinformation websites), how misinformation websites are identified, and how companies advertise on misinformation websites (via an illustrative example) and use digital platforms to automate placing advertisements.

    Participants are then randomized into one control and four treatment groups, in which the information treatments are all based on factual information from our data and prior research. We use an active control design to isolate the effect of providing information relevant to the practice of specific companies on people’s behaviour9. Participants in the control group are given generic information based on prior research that is unrelated to advertising companies or platforms but relevant to topic of news and misinformation.

    In our first ‘company only’ treatment group (T1), participants are given factual information stating that advertisements from their top choice gift card company appeared on misinformation websites in the recent past. Based on their preferences, people may change their final gift card preference away from their initial top-ranked company after receiving this information. It is unclear, however, whether advertising on misinformation websites would cause a sufficient change in consumption patterns and which sets of participants may be more affected.

    Our second ‘platform only’ treatment group (T2) informs participants that companies using digital advertising platforms were about 10 times more likely to appear on misinformation websites than companies that did not use such platforms in the recent past. This information treatment measures the effects of digital advertising platforms in financing misinformation news outlets. Since it does not contain information about advertising companies, it practically serves as a second control group for our company-level outcome and aims to measure how people may respond to our platform-related outcome.

    Because our descriptive data suggest that the use of digital advertising platforms amplifies advertising revenue for misinformation outlets, we are interested in measuring how consumers respond to a specific advertising company appearing on misinformation websites when also informed of the potential role of digital advertising platforms in placing companies’ advertising on misinformation websites. It is unclear whether consumers will attribute more blame to companies or advertising platforms for financing misinformation websites when informed about the role of the different stakeholders in this ecosystem. For this reason, our third ‘company and platform’ treatment (T3) combines information from our first two treatments (T1 and T2). Similar to T1, participants are given factual information that advertisements from their top choice gift card company appeared on misinformation websites in the recent past. Additionally, we informed participants that their top choice company used digital advertising platforms and companies that used such platforms were about ten times more likely to appear on misinformation websites than companies that did not use digital advertising platforms, as mentioned in T2.

    Finally, since several advertising companies appear on misinformation websites, we would like to determine whether informing consumers about other advertising companies also appearing on misinformation websites changes their response towards their top choice company. In our fourth company-ranking treatment (T4), participants are given factual information, which states that “In the recent past, ads from all six companies below repeatedly appeared on misinformation websites in the following order of intensity”, and provided with a ranking from one of three years in our study period—that is, 2019, 2020 or 2021. We personalize these rankings by providing truthful information based on data from different years in the recent past such that the respondents’ top gift card choice company does not appear last in the ranking (that is, is not the company that advertises least on misinformation websites) and in most cases, advertises more intensely on misinformation websites than its potential substitute in the same company category (for example, fast food, food delivery or ride-sharing). Such a treatment allows us to measure potential differences in the direction of consumers switching their gift card choices, such as switching towards companies that advertise more or less intensely on misinformation websites. It could also give consumers reasonable deniability such as “everyone advertises on misinformation websites” leading to ambiguous predictions about the exact impact of the treatment effect.

    Outcomes

    We measure two pre-registered behavioural outcomes that collectively allow us to measure how people respond to our information treatments in terms of both voice and exit25. After the information treatment, all participants are asked to make their final gift card choice from the same six options they were shown earlier. Our main outcome of interest is whether participants ‘exit’ or switch their gift card preference—that is, whether they select a different gift card after the information treatment than their top choice indicated before the information treatment. To ensure incentive compatibility, participants are (truthfully) told that those randomly selected to receive a gift card will be offered the gift card of their choice at the end of our study. As mentioned above, the probability of being randomly chosen to receive a gift card is 20%. We choose a high probability of receiving a gift card relative to other online experiments since prior work has shown that consumers process choice-relevant information more carefully as realization probability increases72. To make the gift card outcome as realistic as possible, we also had a large value gift card (US$25). The focus of our experiments is on single-shot outcomes. While it would have been interesting to capture longer-term effects, the cost of implementing our gift card outcome for a large sample and expenditure on the other studies made a follow-up study cost-prohibitive.

    Secondly, participants are given the option to sign one of several real online petitions that we made and hosted on Change.org. Participants can opt to sign a petition that advocates for either blocking or allowing advertising on misinformation or choose not to sign any petition. Further, participants could choose between two petitions for blocking advertisements on misinformation websites, suggesting that either: (1) advertising companies, or (2) digital advertising platforms, need to block advertisements from appearing on misinformation websites. Overall, participants selected among the following five choices: (1) “Companies like X need to block their ads from appearing on misinformation websites.”, where X is their top choice gift card company; (2) “Companies like X need to allow their ads to appear on misinformation websites.”, where X is their top choice gift card company; (3) “Digital ad platforms used by companies need to block ads from appearing on misinformation websites.”; (4) “Digital ad platforms used by companies need to allow ads to appear on misinformation websites.”; and (5) I do not want to sign any petition. To track the number of petition signatures for each of these four petition options across our randomized groups, we provide separate petition links to participants in each randomized group. We record several petition-related outcomes. First, we measure participants’ intention to sign a petition based on the option they select in this question. Participants who pass our attention check and opt to sign a petition are later provided with a link to their petition of choice. This allows tracking whether participants click on the petition link provided. Participants can also self-report whether they signed the petition. Finally, for each randomized group, we can track the total number of actual petition signatures.

    Our petition outcomes serves two purposes. While our gift card outcome measures how people change their consumption behaviour in response to the information provided, people may also respond to our information treat ments in alternative ways—for example, by voicing their concerns or supplying information to the parties involved25,26. Given that the process of signing a petition is costly, participants’ responses to this outcome would constitute a meaningful measure similar to petition measures used in prior experimental work73,74. Second, since participants must choose between signing either company or platform petitions, this outcome allows us to measure whether or not, across our treatments, people hold advertising companies more responsible for financing misinformation than the digital advertising platforms that automatically place advertisements for companies.

    In addition to our behavioural outcomes, we also record participants’ stated preferences. To do so, we ask participants about their degree of agreement with several statements about misinformation on a seven-point scale ranging from ‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’. These include whether they think: (1) companies have an important role in reducing the spread of misinformation through their advertising practices; and whether (2) digital platforms should give companies the option to avoid advertising on misinformation websites.

    Heterogeneous treatment effects

    We explore heterogeneity in consumer responses along four pre-registered dimensions. First, prior research recognizes differences in the salience of prosocial motivations across gender75, with women being more affected by social-impact messages than men76 and more critical consumers of new media content77. Given these findings, we could expect female participants to be more strongly affected by our information treatments.

    Responses to our information treatments may also differ by respondents’ political orientation. According to prior research, conservatives are especially likely to associate the mainstream media with the term ‘fake news’. These perceptions are generally linked to lower trust in media, voting for Trump, and higher belief in conspiracy theories78. Moreover, conservatives are more likely to consume misinformation2 and the supply of misinformation has been found to be higher on the ideological right than on the left79. Consequently, we might expect stronger treatment effects for left-wing respondents.

    Consumers who more frequently use a company’s products or services could be presumed to be more loyal towards the company or derive greater utility from its use, which could limit changes in their behaviour37. Alternatively, more frequent consumers may be more strongly affected by our information treatments as they may perceive their usage as supporting such company practices to a greater extent than less frequent consumers.

    Finally, we measure whether people’s responses differ by whether they consume misinformation themselves based on whether they reported using misinformation outlets in the initial question asking them to select which news outlets they used in the past 12 months.

    Tackling experimental validity concerns

    In our incentivized, online setting where we measure behavioural outcomes, we expect experimenter demand effects to be minimal as has been evidenced in the experimental literature80,81. We take several steps to mitigate potential experimenter demand effects, including implementing best practices recommended in prior work9. First, our experiment has a neutral framing throughout the survey since the recruitment of participants. While recruiting participants, we invite them to “take a survey about the news, technology and businesses” without making any specific references to misinformation or its effects. While introducing misinformation websites and how they are identified by independent non-partisan organizations, we include examples of misinformation websites across the political spectrum (including both right-wing and left-wing sites) and provide an illustrative example of misinformation by foreign actors. In drafting the survey instruments, the phrasing of the questions and choices available were as neutral as possible. For example, while introducing our online petitions, we presented participants with the option to sign real petitions that suggest both blocking and allowing advertising on misinformation sites. Indeed, we find that the vast majority of participants believe that the information provided in the survey was unbiased as shown in Supplementary Fig. 4. Only about 10% of participants chose one of the ‘biased’ or ‘very biased’ options when asked to rate the political bias of the survey information provided from a seven-point scale ranging from ‘very right-wing biased’ to ‘very left-wing biased’.

    In our active control design, participants in all randomized groups are presented with the same baseline information about misinformation, given misinformation-related information in the information intervention and asked the same questions after the information intervention to emphasize the same topics and minimize potential differences in the understanding of the study across treatment groups. Moreover, to maximize privacy and increase truthful reporting82, respondents complete the surveys on their own devices without the physical presence of a researcher. We also do not collect respondents’ names or contact details (with the exception of eliciting emails to provide gift cards to participants at the end of the study).

    In presenting our information interventions and measuring our behavioural outcomes, we take special care to not highlight the names of the specific entities being randomized across groups to avoid emphasizing what is being measured. We do, however, highlight our gift card incentives by putting the gift card information in bold text to ensure incentive compatibility since prior work has found that failing to make incentives conspicuous can vastly undermine their ability to shift behaviour83.

    Apart from making the above design choices to minimize experimenter demand effects, we measure their relevance using a survey question. Since demand effects are less likely a concern if participants cannot identify the intent of the study9, we ask participants an open-ended question—that is, “What do you think is the purpose of our study?”. Following prior work84,85, we then analyse the responses to this question to examine whether they differ across treatment groups. To measure potential differences in the respondents’ perceptions of the study, we examine their open-ended text responses about the purpose of the study using a Support Vector Machine classifier, which incorporates several features in text analysis, including word, character, and sentence counts, sentiments, topics (using Gensim) and word embeddings. We predict treatment status using the classifier, keeping 75% of the sample for the training set and the remaining 25% as the test set. The classifier predicts treatment status similar to chance for our main treatment groups relative to the control group, as shown in Supplementary Table 11. These results, which are similar in magnitude to those found in previous research84,85, suggest that our treatments do not substantially affect participants’ perceptions about the purpose of the study. Overall, this analysis gives us confidence that our main experimental findings are unlikely to be driven by experimenter demand effects.

    To address external validity concerns, we incorporate additional exit outcomes in the paper, showing that treated individuals switched to lower preference products (Table 1, columns 3 and 4) and products across categories (Table 1, columns 5 and 6) after our information interventions by 8 and 5 percentage points, respectively. We also show in Supplementary Table 8 that as the difference between participants’ highest weighted and second highest weighted gift card choice increases, their switching behaviour decreases. This shows that the weights assigned by participants to their gift card options are capturing meaningful and costly differences in value, highlighting the external validity of our findings. More generally, our pre-registered heterogeneity analysis lends credence to the study’s external validity. In line with expectations, we find that less frequent users and more politically liberal individuals are likelier to switch (see Extended Data Table 3 for the full set of pre-registered heterogeneity results). Moreover, we find that the cost of switching gift cards varies based on participants’ observable characteristics. For example, treated participants who reported not using any of the misinformation news outlets in our survey lost 50% of the median value (US$12.50) of their initial top choice gift card whereas treated participants who reported reading such outlets lost 33.3% of the median value (US$8.33) of their initial top choice gift card. Participants’ text responses also indicate that they believed their choices to be consequential (see Supplementary Tables 1 and 2). As an example, while explaining their choice of gift card, one participant stated, “Because I would most likely use this gift card on my next visit to… and it is less likely that i would use the others.” Regarding the petition outcome, one participant stated “The source of this problem seems to be from the digital advertising platforms, so I’d rather sign the petition that stops them from putting ads on misinformation websites.”

    Decision-maker experiment design

    We followed the same IRB review, pre-registration and consent procedures as those used for our consumer study. This study addresses two research questions. First, we aim to measure the existing beliefs and preferences decision-makers have about advertising on misinformation websites. This will help inform whether companies may be inadvertently or willingly sustaining online misinformation. Secondly, we ask: how do decision-makers update their beliefs and demand for a platform-based solution to avoid advertising on misinformation websites in response to information about the role of platforms in amplifying the financing of misinformation? This will suggest whether companies may be more interested in adopting advertising platforms that reduce the financing of misinformation. To this end, we conduct an information-provision experiment9. While past work has examined how firm behaviour regarding market decisions changes in response to new information48,49, it is unclear how information on the role of digital advertising platforms in amplifying advertising on misinformation would affect decision-makers’ non-market strategies.

    Setting and sample recruitment

    To recruit participants, we partnered with the executive education programmes at the Stanford Graduate School of Business and Heinz College at Carnegie Mellon University. We did so in order to survey senior managers and leaders who could influence strategic decision-making within their firms, in contrast to studies relying heavily on MBA students for understanding decision-making in various contexts such as competition, pricing, strategic alliances and marketing86,87,88,89. Additionally, partnering with two university programmes instead of a specific firm allowed us to access a more diverse sample of companies than prior work that sampled specific types of firms—for example, innovative firms, startups or small businesses90,91,92. Throughout this study, we use the preferences of decision-makers (for example, chief executive officers) as a proxy for company-level preferences since people in such roles shape the outcomes of their companies through their strategic decisions93,94.

    Our partner organizations sent emails to their alumni on our behalf. We used neutral language in our study recruitment emails to attract a broad audience of participants to our survey regardless of their initial beliefs and concerns about misinformation, stating our goal as “conducting vital research on the role of digital technologies in impacting your organization” without mentioning misinformation. We received 567 complete responses, of which 90% are kept since they are from currently employed respondents. To ensure data quality, we dropped an additional 13% of responses where participants were inattentive in answering the survey, resulting in a final sample of 442 responses. These participants were determined to be inattentive since they provided an answer greater than 100 when asked to estimate a number out of 100 in the two questions eliciting their prior beliefs about companies and platforms before the information treatment was provided. Our final sample of 442 respondents is from companies that span all the 23 industries in our descriptive analysis. Moreover, as shown in Supplementary Fig. 5, our sample of participants represents a broad array of company sizes and experience levels at their current roles. Additionally, about 22% of the executives in our sample (and 25% of all our participants) are women, which is aligned with the 21% to 26% industry estimates of women in senior roles globally95,96.

    Supplementary Fig. 2 shows the design of the survey study. We first elicit participants’ current employment status. All those working in some capacity are allowed to continue the survey, whereas the rest of the participants are screened out. After asking for their main occupation, all participants in the experiment are provided with baseline information on misinformation and advertising similar to that provided in the consumer experiment.

    Baseline beliefs and preferences

     In our pre-registration, we highlighted that we would measure the baseline beliefs and preferences of decision-makers. We measure participants’ baseline beliefs about the roles of companies in general, their own company and platforms in general in financing misinformation. Specifically, participants are asked to estimate the number of companies among the most active 100 advertisers whose advertisements appeared on misinformation websites during the past three years (2019–2021). Additionally, we ask participants to report whether they think their company or organization had its advertisements appear on misinformation websites in the past three years. Finally, we measure participants’ beliefs about the role of digital advertising platforms in placing advertisements on misinformation websites. To do so, we first inform participants that during the past three years (2019–2021), out of every 100 companies that did not use digital advertising platforms, eight companies appeared on misinformation websites on average. We then asked participants to provide their best estimate for the number of companies whose advertisements appeared on misinformation websites out of every 100 companies that did use digital advertising platforms.

    In addition to recording participants’ stated preferences using self-reported survey measures, we measure participants’ revealed preferences. To ensure incentive compatibility, participants are asked three questions in a randomized order: (1) information demand about consumer responses—that is, whether they would like to learn how consumers respond to companies whose advertisements appear on misinformation websites (based on our consumer survey experiment); (2) advertisement check—that is, whether they would like to know about their own company’s advertisements appearing on misinformation websites in the recent past; and (3) demand for a solution—that is, whether they would like to sign up for a 15-minute information session on how companies can manage where their advertisements appear online. Participants are told they can receive information about consumer responses at the end of the study if they opt to receive it whereas the advertisement check and solution information are provided as a follow-up after the survey. Participants are required to provide their emails and company name for the advertisement check. To sign up for an information session from our industry partner on a potential solution to avoid advertising on misinformation websites, participants sign up on a separate form by providing their emails. Since all three types of information offered are novel and otherwise costly to obtain, we expect respondents’ demand for such information to capture their revealed preferences.

    Information intervention

    Participants are then randomized into a treatment group, which receives information about the role of digital advertising platforms in placing advertising on misinformation websites, and a control group, which does not receive this information. Based on the dataset we assembled, participants are given factual information that companies that used digital advertising platforms were about ten times more likely to appear on misinformation websites than companies that did not use such platforms in the recent past. This information is identical to the information provided to participants in the T2 (that is, platform only) group in the consumer experiment.

    Outcomes

    After the information intervention, we first measure participants’ posterior beliefs about the role of digital advertising platforms in placing advertisements on misinformation websites following our pre-registration. Participants are told about the average number of companies whose advertisements appear per month on misinformation websites that are not monetized by digital advertising platforms. They are then asked to estimate the average number of companies whose advertisements appear monthly on misinformation websites that use digital advertising platforms. This question measures whether participants believe that the use of digital advertising platforms amplifies advertising on misinformation websites.

    We record two behavioural outcomes, which were pre-registered as our primary outcomes of interest after the information intervention. Our main outcome of interest is the respondents’ demand for a platform-based solution to avoid advertising on misinformation websites. Participants can opt to learn more about two different types of information—that is: (1) which platforms least frequently place companies’ advertising on misinformation websites; and (2) which types of analytics technologies are used to improve advertising performance—or opt not to receive any information. Since participants can only opt to receive one of the two types of information, this question is meant to capture the trade-off between respondents’ concern for avoiding misinformation outlets and their desire to improve advertising performance, respectively. Participants are told that they will be provided with the information they choose at the end of this study. Following the literature in measuring information acquisition97, we measure respondents’ demand for solution information, which serves as a revealed-preference proxy for their interest in implementing a solution for their organization.

    Additionally, to measure whether the information treatment increases concern for financing misinformation in general, we record a second behavioural measure. Participants are told that the research team will donate US$100 to one of two organizations after randomly selecting one of the first hundred responses: (1) the GDI; and (2) DataKind, which helps mission-driven organizations increase their impact by unlocking their data science potential ethically and responsibly.

    Tackling experimental validity concerns

    Similarly to our consumer experiment, this survey was carried out in an online setting, where experimenter demand effects are limited80,81. We followed best practices9 by keeping the treatment language neutral and ensuring the anonymity of the participants wherever possible. We find that most participants believe that the information provided in the survey was unbiased. Only about 7% of participants chose one of the ‘biased’ or ‘very biased’ options when asked to rate the political bias of the survey information provided from a seven-point scale ranging from ‘very right-wing biased’ to ‘very left-wing biased’.

    Importantly, to ensure truthful reporting, our main experimental outcomes were incentive-compatible. In particular, respondents who chose our platform solution demand outcome to learn about which platforms least contribute to placing companies’ advertisements on misinformation websites had to face a trade-off between receiving this information and receiving information on improving advertising performance. Additionally, our baseline information demand outcomes elicited before the information intervention were also incentive-compatible in that participants would be asked to follow up on their decisions whether they opted for additional information via email or via an online information session.

    These design choices are made to minimize demand effects on our main outcomes of interest. However, it is possible that these effects are still relevant, partially because participants may have an interest in ‘doing the right thing’ on a survey administered by an institution they have a connection with. We measure the relevance of potential demand effects using a survey question mirroring the approach used for our consumer experiment. To measure potential differences in the respondents’ perceptions of the study across our treatment and control groups, we predict treatment status based on respondents’ open-ended text responses about the purpose of the study via a support vector machine classifier, keeping 75% of the sample for the training set and the remaining 25% as the test set. We find that the classifier is only slightly worse than random chance in predicting treatment status (Supplementary Table 16) but similar in magnitude to those in the consumer experiment. Therefore, although experimenter demand effects may still be present, these results suggest that these effects do not drive our findings.

    We address the external validity of our findings by verifying the decision-making capacity of our respondents within their organizations and by examining the generalizability of our sample. We find that the vast majority of those whose job titles we verify (94%) serve in executive or managerial roles within their organizations. The regression estimates in Supplementary Tables 18 and 19 show that our results remain qualitatively and quantitatively similar after the exclusion of the small sample of individuals in non-executive and non-managerial roles. Moreover, the verified and self-reported decision-makers are similar across observable characteristics as reported in Supplementary Table 17, suggesting limited selection in our verification process. To examine the generalizability of our sample, we investigate their observable characteristics. As shown in Supplementary Fig. 5, our sample of participants represents a broad array of company sizes and experience levels at their current roles. Additionally, about 22% of the executives in our sample (and 25% of all our participants) are women, which is aligned with the 21% to 26% industry estimates of women in senior roles globally95,96.

    Reporting summary

    Further information on research design is available in the Nature Portfolio Reporting Summary linked to this article.

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  • Nature’s message to South Africa’s next government: talk to your researchers

    Nature’s message to South Africa’s next government: talk to your researchers

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    Long line of people waiting to cast their vote in South Africa first election in 1994.

    South Africa’s first free elections in 1994.Credit: Mike Persson/AFP/Getty

    As Nature went to press, South Africans were going to the polls to vote for a new parliament — as they have done every five years since 1994, when the country held its first free, multi-party election. Once the votes cast on 29 May have been counted, it is possible that the African National Congress, which led the struggle for liberation and has governed South Africa continuously for 30 years, will have to share power with other parties for the first time. The country is at risk of being overwhelmed by deep-rooted problems, and for the best chance of resolving these, all parties need to work together. Researchers are ready to play their part.

    Historically, South Africa has had one of the African continent’s strongest science systems. After Egypt, it is Africa’s leading producer of scientific research, and, according to a report from the country’s science department, the number of publications the country produces per capita is increasing year-on-year (see go.nature.com/3wx4jjg). Diversity is also rising in the scientific workforce. As of 2021 (the latest year for which data are available) — and from a standing start in 1994 — nearly half of the nation’s publications included Black authors from South Africa. (Black, in the report, means “black African, coloured, Indian/Asian South African nationals only”; ‘coloured’ is an official demographic term used in South Africa.) Black people also make up a sizeable proportion of the nation’s upcoming talent. Some 44% of doctorates in sciences, mathematics and engineering were awarded to Black people in 2020, the report finds, and the trend is continuing.

    South Africa is also respected for its global contributions. It has a record of combining depth in scholarly knowledge with a commitment to championing knowledge-sharing to benefit all of humanity. This was perhaps most apparent during the COVID-19 pandemic, when South Africa’s diplomats worked with their counterparts in India to try to ensure that intellectual property for vaccines and therapeutics — created using data gathered by researchers everywhere — could be freely shared in a pandemic. It was a cause that Nature also backed. Ultimately, the campaign was unsuccessful, but its advocates were brave to take a stand and press others to do the right thing.

    In South Africa, such strengths could now be applied on the home front. But for this to happen, the government must recognize them and allow researchers to make greater contributions to tackling the nation’s problems.

    By many indicators, progress seems to be going into reverse. South Africa has debt problems, worsened by two big setbacks — economic growth nosedived after the 2008 financial crisis and again during the COVID-19 pandemic.

    Thirty years after the end of Apartheid, successive South African governments have made, at best, halting progress towards meeting the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). A study by the World Bank and the Development Bank of South Africa found that four out of five rural roads are unpaved (see go.nature.com/3rqm5bn); around half of households lack safe water and sanitation; and an ongoing energy crisis means frequent power cuts. Moreover, although the nation has been a destination for people from elsewhere in Africa for decades, xenophobia is rising, even at universities. All of these need to be tackled.

    Progress towards a number of SDG targets could be improved with more funding. The World Bank study found that to achieve climate-resilient transport, education, water and sanitation by the SDG deadline of 2030 will cost between 8% and 11% of South Africa’s gross domestic product every year. This is not a small sum, and would require the government to borrow more, tax people more or cut public spending — or some combination of the three.

    The problem for South Africa, like many other low- and middle-income countries, is that its economy is not strong enough to sustain further borrowing. Meanwhile, raising more money through general taxation or cuts to public spending would hurt the very people the SDGs aim to help.

    A potential alternative is to levy an extra tax on the wealthiest citizens. Among the countries for which data are available, South Africa is the world’s most unequal society (A. Chatterjee et al. World Bank Econ. Rev. 36, 19–36; 2022). The proceeds of a wealth tax would be used to boost public services that are used by the poorest, including universities. It does not need to be a recurring tax, but could be a one-off charge, for use in the aftermath of emergencies.

    The idea of wealth tax is gaining ground among economists, notably at the Paris-based World Inequality Lab (WIL; see go.nature.com/3yyicmf). However, relevant data are lacking. “We have much better information on people’s income than on their wealth,” says Léo Czajka, a researcher at WIL who studies inequality in South Africa. For a wealth tax to work, an international agreement would be needed that countries would collect and share relevant data on citizens’ wealth. This would allow governments to better anticipate the implications of a wealth tax, as well as reducing the risk of more nations becoming tax havens.

    In 2002, just eight years after South Africa’s liberation, the country’s researchers were among those who welcomed the international community to Johannesburg to attend a UN summit that was an important staging-post on the road to agreeing the SDGs. The nation’s policymakers should again look to scientists. Our message to whichever party, or parties, wins the election is this: talk to your researchers. Involve them. They are ready to play their part.

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  • How artificial intelligence is helping to identify global inequalities

    How artificial intelligence is helping to identify global inequalities

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    Fabio Pulizzi: 00:09

    Hello, this is How to Save Humanity in 17 Goals, a podcast brought to you by Nature Careers in partnership with Nature Water.

    I’m Fabio Pulizzi, chief editor at Nature Water. This is a series where we meet the scientists working towards the Sustainable Development Goals agreed by the United Nations and world leaders in 2015.

    Since then, in a huge global effort, thousands of researchers have been using those targets to tackle the biggest problems that the planet faces today.

    In episode 10, we look at Sustainable Development Goal number 10: to reduce inequality in and among countries. And meet an academic works to improve opportunity to level the playing field.

    Francisco Ferreira 01:03

    So I’m Francisco Ferreira, and I’m the Amartya Sen Professor of Inequality Studies at the London School of Economics, where I also direct the International Inequalities Institute.

    Sustainable development goal number 10 is about reducing inequalities, both within and among countries. And it’s got, you know, like all the Sustainable Development Goals, it’s got different targets and indicators and so on.

    As to how aware I am of it when I’m conducting my research, you know, I’ve been studying inequality and working on inequality since before the Sustainable Development Goals. But obviously, when they came up, you know, they’re a huge sort of unifying force, a kind of a rallying cry for policymakers around the world.

    And so that did become important to those of us working on it. And in fact, I was a little bit involved in the, in the design of some of the targets, because I was working at the World Bank at the time.

    And this concept that target 10.1 has, which is about sustaining income growth for the bottom 40% of the population at a rate higher than the national average, is something that we came up with at the World Bank under the heading of “shared prosperity.”

    Yeah, inequality can mean different things to different people. But I think there are two main definitions that I like to think about.

    One, which is perhaps the primary definition, it’s just a measure of dispersion in a distribution of something among some group. So the distribution of income amongst people, or the distribution of years of schooling amongst countries, or the distribution of wealth amongst households.

    So we just measure how far apart those incomes or wealth are from one another, or from the average. And that’s really what most inequality is. Now the secondary definition is that people say, individuals or countries that have other characteristics as well.

    So if we’re thinking of individuals they have races or genders or ethnicities. And so we can take the same measures of inequality, but among groups, rather than between people. And whereas the between people is often called vertical inequality, the measures amongst groups are often called horizontal inequality.

    And one is not better than the other. They’re just different. And they inform us about different things. But often when people think about inequality between men and women, for example That’s an example of horizontal inequality.

    So as I was saying, inequality is, is about how things are distributed, right? So in a sense it’s important to understand the causes of that. Because nobody lives on the average, right? If you think of yourself, you’re not exactly on the average, whoever you are listening to this, you’re not exactly on the average, or maybe close to the average, and maybe richer than the average and maybe poorer than the average.

    So averages don’t matter on their own. When a country produces a certain amount of output or generates a certain amount of income, what really matters in the end is who gets to benefit from it, to what extent.

    And there’s quite a lot of evidence, scientific evidence based on experiments, on experiments with people and experiments with monkeys. And there are surveys. There’s all kinds of different evidence that on the whole people prefer equality to inequality. Even monkeys get uncomfortable if they see an uneven distribution of food in their group.

    And human beings tend to have a preference for fairness, if not exactly equality, at least for fairness. And so because of those preferences, and because also inequality can offset how an economy functions. You know, if a lot of people are very poor, they can’t get their children into good schools, or they can’t invest in their own learning or in owning their own business ideas, and the economy ends up being less vital and less vibrant than it might otherwise have been.

    So both for intrinsic reasons that we care about fairness, and also instrumental reasons that, you know, more equality tends to be associated with better functioning outcomes for everyone, it’s important to understand where that inequality comes from, and whether we can or should do anything about it.

    Francisco Ferreira 05:48

    I was born in São Paulo, Brazil. São Paulo is the largest city in Brazil, the largest city in South America. And Brazil is a incredibly unequal country.

    And I grew up in a middle class to upper middle class household in São Paulo, and I was exposed very early on to the huge gaps, right. So I would drive around or drive to school, for example, and, and see people my age selling chewing gum on the streets.

    And it occurred to me that there was something odd about that. And I had a sense straightaway that it wasn’t only about how different we were then, but that our whole lives would be different.

    So I guess I was interested from very early on in ideas of justice, and, and ideas of what determine the distribution of life chances and outcomes in Brazil. And from there I ended up going to the London School of Economics where I did my PhD, which was very fortunate because at the time, inequality wasn’t a central question in economics, so much as it had been in the classical days.

    But in the 1980s and early 90s. It wasn’t yet but. But at LSE it was. And we had some really important thinkers and professors who had been there like Amartya Sen or Tony Atkinson. So I learned a lot from these these guys. And it was hugely important. Then I spent a lot of my career at the World Bank where we in the research department worked a lot on the measurement of global poverty and global inequality.

    And so I worked there for many years before eventually returning to my alma mater, to the LSE, now as a professor on this topic.

    Inequality of opportunity is basically differences in in people’s life chances for reasons that they don’t control.

    So for example, when the COVID pandemic hit the UK, and, you know, 17% of all workers in April 2020, lost their jobs, there was a almost five percentage point difference in terms of women having lost their jobs, five percentage points more than than men. You know, another example is in South Africa, in 2017, the average income for a white household was 5.6 times larger than an African household.

    So these are examples of, these are examples of huge differences that are determined by factors that people don’t control themselves like race, or gender, or parental background, or where you come from.

    So inequality of opportunity is about differences that we observe in society, which are not due to, say, “Ah this person worked harder than the other one, or was more responsible than the other one.” But really have to do with things we inherit, and cannot control race, ethnicity, family background, where we were born, our earliest experiences, and so.

    There are a number of people out there who are really interested in an opportunity. But the reason I think it deserves more attention than it gets is that in a sense, I like to think of inequality a little bit like cholesterol, you know, there’s two kinds. And one is worse than the other.

    You could think of inequality of effort or inequality that rewards responsibility in some senses, the good cholesterol. The really bad cholesterol, the really bad inequality is the one that we inherit, that we’re not responsible for.

    And of course, it shapes also how much effort we put in and how much responsibility we have. I’m not suggesting and at least that they’re, they’re separable in that easy way.

    Of course, we are shaped by the circumstances we inherit. So quite a lot of the inequality that we see really is inherited and is inequality of opportunity.

    And it’s the bad cholesterol in two senses. It’s the bad cholesterol in the sense that it is the one that people find most objectionable. And again, without getting into the details, there are experiments out there. There’s a lot of work done by people in Norway, for example, in Bergen, at the Fair Institute, they’re looking at, you know, how do people in games, how do players in games with real money. What do they really object to, when are they prepared to pay to have a more equal outcome in their game?

    And it’s typically when the inequality arises from something the players do not control, like, they will randomize, they were randomly given a lower wage rate and a game or something like that.

    So there’s a lot of evidence that people object to that kind of inherited or, or or, you know, arbitrary inequality that we cannot control. It’s also the bad cholesterol in the instrumental sense, how inequality can harm the economy as a whole.

    Because, you know, the example I like to think of this as a Brazilian is, if you think of all the kids growing up in the Brazilian slums, in the hills in Rio, or in various areas in São Paulo, or other cities, you know, how many engineers and scientists and great writers and so on, that could have been there, and some of them will make it, but many, many fewer than would otherwise make it. Just because of the quality of the schools they are confined to, and other hardships and having to get out of school early to help their parents, all sorts of other other things that happen to them. Crime, violence.

    So there’s a lot of wasted human talent, a lot of human potential that goes to waste, because it is not given those opportunities that other that other people have. So inequality of opportunities is, you know, the bad cholesterol in both of the senses. And so I think it deserves even more attention than it already gets.

    Francisco Ferreira 11:58

    Another reason, perhaps why people talk less about inequality of opportunity than, than I think we should, is because there isn’t yet full agreement on on how we should measure it, and on the idea of data that, that we need to observe it. You know, in a sense, inequality of opportunities quite close as a concept to the inverse of intergenerational mobility.

    So there is a lot of work out there on on measuring the association between parents and children, say the incomes of fathers and sons or mothers and daughters.

    And that association measured in different ways and elasticity, or a correlation, or a rank correlation, those measures are popular and are, are often widely available.

    They’re very close to what inequality of opportunity seeks to measure because it is about the influence of inherited circumstances on life today. I find that by looking only at income, we’re ignoring some of the other factors that are important in shaping opportunities.

    Parental income is hugely important. There is evidence, there are a few studies that suggest that in many countries race, or parental wealth, are important independently of income, in addition to income. Economists say even when you control for income, these other things are still important. And so you’d like if you’d like in some sense, to get a measure of the overall extent to which inequality that we observe today is inherited these past circumstances, you’d like to observe things beyond income and to go beyond the studies just mobility, which are very important and informative in their own right. But you’d like to go beyond that.

    But then we get into this question of, in some sense, where do we stop? Does any dataset contain all of the information that we need? And how do we put that together? And there are some statistical issues, but they pose some challenges. And that’s some of the areas in which my group at LSE has been working.

    Francisco Ferreira 14:26

    In the end, we’ve come I think, to accept that these measures of the extent to which inequality that we observe is inherited, are never going to be perfect, because you’re never going to observe all of the data on circumstances.

    So we need to think of them as flaws, as indications of at least how much of the inequality that we see today, is inherited. And now we have some different techniques and approaches to just select the circumstances that are most important.

    And these use machine learning tools. These techniques are not magic, that they’re just designed to look at a data set and extract the most powerful predictors, the most salient divisions in society in some sense.

    These are machine learning techniques, I mean, in some very basic sense, they are artificial intelligence in the sense that they are supervised learning, you know, the computer is learning from, from the data that it’s, that it’s looking at. What it does is fundamentally, look at the way income, say is distributed and how it’s related, how it’s associated with different characteristics.

    So when it looks at South Africa, for example, just looking at the sample, it finds, it’s very heavily associated with race.

    So it’ll use race as a first splitting point. And then it it keeps going. And so then it will find that, you know, mother’s education is actually the thing that’s most associated in that area. Father’s education in their other area. Maybe occupation, maybe place of birth, and it keeps looking for the most salient variable that is inherited, that is beyond people’s control, that seems to predict income differences.

    And it tells us then, how to partition the population in a way that is most predictive of income, most salient. And from that division, we can we can obtain thesei measures of inequality. And that’s what they’re designed to do.

    And when we apply those to, to this problem, we tend to find much larger numbers. In a recent paper we did for Latin America, we find an average about 50%. And some countries in the 60% range. And for South Africa, we find a number nearer 70%, suggesting that, you know, even with the imperfect, imperfect information that we have, in a country like Brazil, or Guatemala, about two thirds of the inequality that we observe, is fully inherited.

    And that’s likely to be just a base. And in South Africa, the two thirds really are inherited. In richer countries, in Europe, in the United States, the numbers are a bit lower. In some of the more egalitarian European countries, they are in the 20 to 30% range. In the United States, they are under sort of 40% range.

    And then so again, is just an indication of, at a minimum, how much of the inequality that we observe is deeply unfair.

    The second one is really about whether there’s a relationship between these kinds of inequality and the aggregate performance of the economy.

    For example, economic growth. And there are a number of studies of that, some of which have found quite a substantial impact, actually. There’s a very nice study in the Journal of Development Economics by by two Spanish economista, Mateo and Rodrigues. who find that if they look across states in the US, and the US Census data for the states over a 30 year period, and they look at growth in in GDP per capita of each state.

    And they find that if you look at the association between just aggregate overall inequality, income inequality, and, and growth in the States, they don’t find much.

    But when they separate out between these two components, right, the bad cholesterol, inequality of opportunity, and the residual, some of which is an equality of effort, and some of which is just things we don’t observe, and in terms of circumstances. But anyway, when they split it between those two, they find it as something of a positive association between inequality of effort and growth, and a very negative association between inequality of opportunity and growth.

    That is to say, those states, where more of the distribution seems to reflect inherited factors like race, like differences in family background, and so on, and so forth, grow more slowly than those states, which have less of that kind of inequality.

    And this has been replicated in Brazil and a number of other countries And then there are other kinds of studies that don’t use this kind of cross country regression method.

    But there have also found, for example, that the opening up of opportunity in the medical and legal professions in the United States, to women, and then to African Americans, over the course of the 20th century, contributed a great deal to growth in the output of those professions. That also has model-based simulations in it and so on.

    But it’s a, you know, it’s an influential paper that also reflects this idea that that more opportunity means more talent can be used, and out of that comes more production and more efficiency.

    There are at least two basic ways in which we can use that information on measurement that we have created. To reduce the rate, right, to help generate policies that will make a difference and improve the lives of those of the bottom.

    One is simply targeting if you like, I mean, what is simply getting a map, a social map of society. So these, these trees, they generate, effectively a map of social groups. And we can see what their average income is and what their distribution is.

    And we can see which groups, again determined purely by circumstances they inherited, which groups do systematically worse than others and persistently so.

    And then presumably, if you wanted to target a program with early childhood development, or a program of improving teacher practices in certain schools, you might want to do it in the, in the areas where a majority of these people live first. And you may want to put most, most resources into those groups.

    Because the other thing about inequality of opportunity is that we know that people who have the least advantage, you know, whose circumstances hold them back the most, in a sense, those are the people for whom it will be hardest to advance.

    So in some sense, they should get not just equal treatment, but better treatment, because the intervention needs to compensate for the drag of the background, if you understand so.

    So this is one way. And in fact, some of our funders and foundations that we work with are very interested exactly in that aspect of this kind of social map of societies in Latin America in particular, that we’re working on. That’s one way, there’s another way, which is actually through, in some sense, through the political process, which is, we feel that by highlighting the extent to which inequality is unjust and reflects things that have nothing to do with people’s responsibilities that people cannot control, that people simply inherit, we may contribute to an understanding of just how unfair inequality is, and therefore enhance political support for redistribution more broadly.

    And there are many places in the world. Nowadays, in Europe and the United States, there’s already a great deal of understanding of the costs of inequality, which was not necessarily true in the US 30 years ago. But it is more so now after the, you know, the 1% Movement and the global financial crisis and Tomhas Piketty’s work and so on. But in many places, you know, I remember talking to an African president once when I was at the World Bank.

    And he wanted to reduce poverty, he wanted to understand what more he could do in policy terms to accelerate poverty reduction in his country. And, and when we talked about inequality, his eyes glazed out a little bit. And he said, “Well, you know, inequality is not something we can worry about in Africa, because, you know, we have so little. We have to, we have to work our way from the bottom up for everyone. Handouts won’t work.”

    And then when you sort of get across to him, the idea that actually by giving more opportunities to some of these poorest people, their contribution to the economy, their own output, their own incomes, what they do for themselves, will improve. It’s not about handouts, it’s about chances to produce, chances to lift yourself up.

    You know, he changed his whole outlook. And in fact, I don’t want to give too many details. But in fact, I’m told by my former World Bank colleagues that they were policy changes and programs created, in part as a result of his being convinced that that there was something and I’m reducing inequality that went beyond handouts and had efficiency consequences.

    Francisco Ferreira 23:58

    So the thing about sustainable goal number 10 is it doesn’t have a specific numerical target like goal one has, right. So goal one says, well, this this the pure UN version of goal one says completely eradicate extreme poverty by 2030.

    The slightly more realistic World Bank version of that says, let’s reduce it to 3% or below. And that goal will almost certainly not be met by 2030, in part, because of COVID, which represented a regression and a slowdown in poverty reduction. But in part, actually, because of inequality, interestingly enough. Because in some sense, the poverty that remains is the poverty that is hardest to reach, is the poverty in the poorest countries in the poorest people of the poorest countries.

    And it’s harder to reach those parts of the poverty map if you like. But I think if we look at inequality between countries and inequality within countries, it will be difficult to conclude that it has been very satisfactory match.

    Because there are many countries where inequality has grown over the last years, there’s a sense sometimes that inequality has grown everywhere. And this is actually not true. There are many countries where inequality has fallen. Pretty much however you measure it, a number of those are actually in Latin America.

    But there are also many, many countries where it has grown, no matter how you measure it. And so the inequality within countries, and this is true in the US, and it is true in a number of other countries that, you know, we won’t be able to say that we met that.

    In terms of inequality. between countries, there was actually a long trend of convergence and inequality, between countries driven primarily by the growth of places like China and India, which for the last half century or so has been much faster than than in the West. COVID produced a little bit of a setback to that, particularly because of India.

    But by 2030, the process may have resumed. The issue there looking forward is a different worry. And that worry is now that China is around the middle of the global distribution, and its growth in the future will no longer contribute to a reduction in inequality, but in fact, possibly to an increase in between country inequality, then these trends may change considerably but that’ll be likely after 2030.

    Fabil Pulizzi: 26:53

    Thanks for listening to this series How to Save Humanity in 17 Goals.

    Join us again next time when we look at Sustainable Development Goal number 11: how to improve our cities. See you then.

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  • The global economy’s 200-year growth spurt — and what comes next

    The global economy’s 200-year growth spurt — and what comes next

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    Femal worker in the foreground works among others on a production line at the world's largest supplier of transformers. Rugao, Jiangsu Province, China.

    Increasing demand for digital technologies drives work at the world’s largest transformer supplier, in Rugao, China.Credit: Costfoto/Future Publishing/Getty

    Growth: A Reckoning Daniel Susskind Allen Lane/Belknap (2024)

    For decades, the global economy has been growing by 2–5% per year. This growth is eating up ever more resources, destroying biodiversity and ushering in dangerous levels of global warming. Endless growth of this kind isn’t sustainable. What can be done? Should growth be maintained, but differently, to protect Earth while resolving inequalities and other social problems? Or should growth be curbed and the global economy stabilized or even shrunk? These are crucial questions with complex answers, about which people disagree fervently.

    In Growth, economist Daniel Susskind delves into the roots of these problems and offers suggestions. His passages putting economic growth into historical context are engaging. Yet, in my view, his wider analyses and solutions are too limited to make this book a good starting point for the broad moral discussion that he advocates.

    Growth, past and future

    Susskind begins by pointing out how economic growth is a recent phenomenon. For around 300,000 years, while societies were mainly agricultural or capable only of subsistence, overall long-term prosperity remained more or less stagnant. Then, around the start of the nineteenth century, something unprecedented happened: the global economy began a 200-year growth spurt.

    Why? Economists have no definitive answer, Susskind rightly concludes. He provides an insightful overview of hypotheses, based on factors including capital investment, technological progress, skilled and educated workers, and cultural and institutional conditions. He highlights the importance of innovations such as medical science and breakthroughs in transportation and manufacturing. And he stresses that a society that is more receptive to science is also culturally better equipped to apply these innovations in the economy.

    In the aftermath of the Second World War, economic growth was propelled to the top of the list of policy objectives in the West. It was seen as key to rebuilding shattered European economies, and crucial to prevailing in the cold war and in creating full employment — an important objective since the Great Depression in the 1930s. The idea spread and went on to become a global policy objective.

    Gross domestic product (GDP) came to be seen as a measure of the success of a society — and an end in itself, rather than a means to an end, as most economists see it. But this posed a “growth dilemma”, Susskind notes. On the one hand, “GDP is correlated with almost every measure of human flourishing”. On the other, the fossil fuels and digital technologies underlying this economic growth are “climate-destroying, inequality-creating, work-threatening, politics-undermining, and community-disrupting”.

    An aerial view over a chemically deforested area of the Amazon jungle caused by illegal mining activities in the river basin of the Madre de Dios region in southeast Peru. Dried patches around a left over central green area.

    Illegal gold mining has led to deforestation in the Peruvian Amazon.Credit: Cris Bouroncle/AFP/Getty

    Public discussions about how to resolve this dilemma are contentious, even factional. To oversimplify, there are two main camps. One, championing ‘green growth’, extols the benefits of economic expansion and stresses that it can be achieved sustainably. The second, focused on ‘degrowth’, argues that economic growth is not the solution to social and ecological problems, but the cause. It holds that these issues can be solved only by a democratically agreed reduction in growth in rich countries.

    Susskind refers to his own position as “weak degrowth”, but spends much time analysing how to “unleash” growth by reforming intellectual-property laws, increasing research and development and getting more people to innovate. He makes a powerful argument that society must dictate the direction of innovation — towards green technologies, for example — to reduce the negative effects of growth.

    Yet, Susskind admits, hard choices will inevitably be required. Choosing whether to pursue more or less economic growth will always affect “other goals”, such as a healthy climate, fair distribution of wealth, cohesive communities, well-paid and high-quality work and a functioning democracy. To navigate these decisions, he suggests, society will need to ask itself some deep “moral questions” through participatory democratic processes such as citizens’ assemblies.

    A reckoning

    What should a reader make of this? Just like Susskind, I am no expert on all the scientific domains needed to make such choices. No one is. I’m sympathetic to his remark that it is impossible to write on such a broad topic and provide a full and uncontroversial overview of all the literature. But, in many sections, such as the one on GDP, I was unconvinced.

    I have worked in national accounts and on alternatives to GDP. Yet I was confused by Susskind’s argument that economists should follow “GDP minimalism”, such that GDP should be limited to measuring the “taxable income” of society. He lists many well-known problems with GDP and proposals to expand its scope, but does not say what exactly he would change.

    For example, Susskind argues that economists should not expand the scope of GDP by factoring in damages such as air pollution. He bases this on “moral modesty” — in his view, value-laden choices have no place in a quantitative metric. Yet he does not provide a comprehensive way of judging what is in and what is out. Many sectors that contribute to current GDP figures — such as tobacco, alcohol, fossil fuels, gambling, social media and businesses that take advantage of monopolies or price gouging — might also be considered immoral. Should those be removed?

    Susskind also wants to restrict what GDP measures to emphasize “technical diligence”. It is unclear what that would mean. The quantity and quality of health services are hard to measure, for example; should these be excluded from economic growth figures? And the availability of data varies for each country. Should internationally comparable GDP figures be abandoned and each country have its own definitions? Or should economists revert to the lowest common denominator, considering only factors for which every country has adequate statistics? The book is inconclusive.

    Susskind suggests using a dashboard of indicators rather than adjusting GDP. Yet, strangely, he doesn’t reference influential dashboards such as the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals or its predecessors, the Millennium Development Goals, which have existed for decades.

    Moral maze

    Deeper problems lurk in the theoretical foundation of Growth. Four things stand out.

    First, the standard view in the literature is that economic growth is a means to an end, not the end itself. Yet, without justification, Susskind frames his arguments around achieving economic growth as a goal, alongside others.

    Second, he argues that, because ideas are infinite, there is no limit to possible economic growth. This is quite a claim, and he does not provide convincing support. He simply points to the possible combinations of atoms and the number of recipes one could make from a given set of ingredients. Because the number of variations is huge, he thinks it likely that society will continue to generate enough useful ideas to go on expanding the economy.

    Yet, some of the books Susskind refers to undermine that. For example, Robert Gordon’s Rise and Fall of American Growth (2016) argues that the generation of useful ideas (those that contribute to quality of life) has slowed since the 1970s, and that this is why we should not expect economic growth to continue.

    In medicine, too, the rate of discovery has reduced in the past few decades. Life expectancy dropped in many countries during the COVID-19 pandemic. And many high-income nations are experiencing increased mortality owing to ‘bad’ ideas including drugs, alcohol, fast food and guns.

    Third, Susskind argues that growth-driving ideas are unrestricted by the limits of a finite planet. Yet, scientists have shown that six out of nine ‘planetary boundaries’ — Earth systems, such as climate change, that will have a huge effect on current and future generations — are being crossed (K. Richardson et al. Sci. Adv. 9, eadh2458; 2023). Given this, Susskind’s unfounded optimism seems too large a risk.

    Fourth, Susskind’s ‘moral discussion’ framing seems restrictive. He is willing to sacrifice a bit of growth for the sake of “other” societal goals. But, frankly, I was expecting a deeper discussion of what constitutes ‘a good life’ and how those lives could be led in a way that respects the limits of the planet and takes into account other people and future generations. I would also expect a discussion of the sacrifices that people might need to make, in terms of diet, transportation, consumption or taxation. I see no justification that ‘expanding economic activity by between 0 and x%’ is a valid boundary to such a fundamental moral debate.

    In sum, Growth offers a readable and useful introduction to the green-growth perspective. There are insightful parts and I support a plea for a moral reckoning. But the book omits crucial environmental insights and lacks the robustness needed for such a foundational debate around the goals of society.

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  • why multinationals need a helping hand

    why multinationals need a helping hand

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    Fabio Pullizi: 00:09

    Hello, this is How to Save Humanity in 17 Goals, a podcast brought to you by Nature Careers in partnership with Nature Water. I’m Fabio Pulizzi, chief editor at Nature Water.

    Welcome again to the series where we meet the scientists working towards the global development targets brokered by the United Nations.

    In 2015, world leaders pledged to solve a range of economic, environmental and social issues. A package of 17 sustainable development goals were agreed upon.

    Since then, in a huge effort, thousands of researchers all over the world have been tackling the biggest problems that the planet faces today.

    In episode eight, we look at sustainable development goal number eight: to promote economic growth and decent work for all. And meet an enterprise expert from Kenya, who thinks that nurturing micro and small businesses is one solution.

    Moses Ngoze: 01:16

    I’m Moses Ngoze. I’ m a senior lecturer at Masinde Muliro University, found in Kakamega, western part of Kenya.

    There I teach enterpreneurship and management science courses. Apart from that, I research in enterpreneurship, and management science.

    And mostly my research looks at enterpreneurship basically in Sub Saharan Africa, how it can improve the economies of the people within the country.

    Yes, sustainable goal number eight is to promote sustained and inclusive economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all.

    We find out that micro small enterprises create employment, they produce products, they are centres of innovation, and thereby through this, they lead to the growth of the economy by giving the income and generating employment. And these businesses are the best way to achieve sustainable business growth in Africa.

    Through employment, we have big population so they’d be able to create employment. And also they create what we call industrialization. These enterprises are the best way of achieving sustainable goal number eight.

    Moses Ngoze: 02:49

    So what are these micro small and medium enterprises? Now, these are enterprises that basically employ between one up to 100 employees. And most of these enterprises are in the developing world.

    Basically, worldwide, these particular firms account for the 90% of the firms within the world. So it means that 10% are large enterprise or multinationals.

    And within Kenya, the micro, small, and medium enterprises, they account for around 75% of the total employment and more than 80% of the gross domestic product of our country.

    I was born in Kenya, a place called Kisumu. Kisumu is, from the capital city of Kenya is a one hour flight. And it’ s found on the western part of Kenya.

    When I was studying in my primary and high school, my passion has been always trying to impact knowledge on other people.

    And this really motivated me to pursue an undergraduate degree that is in economics and mathematics. And then later, I taught in various higher institutions of learning.

    And then by that teaching the institution of higher learning, I discovered my other passion that was doing research and consultancy. And also publication, basically in my area of concentration, which is economics, and then entrapreneurship.

    And I still do a lot of research in micro, small and medium enterprises and others sectors in the Sub Saharan Africa

    Moses Ngoze 05:08

    So what is jua kali? Jua kali basically is a Kiswahili word that literally translated to English to mean hot sun.

    So many people could see those particular people working under hot sun. So that’s why loosely they gave it the name jua kali.

    And in Kenya context, it has come to be referred to as these industries, micro small and medium enterprises. The jua kali sector has got those we call the artisans. Most micro small enterprise are involved in the primary production, like farmers who are producing commodities from home.

    Like say, for example, eggs. We have a farmer who is keeping chicken. The medium enterprises are those particular ones that are manufacturing products. Bakeries, we have bakeries, confectionaries, we also have those who sell clothes. We also have those who have got hotels.

    Most of the countries in Africa, positoin of women is quite large. And therefore, these women can be able to get jobs in these particular enterprises.

    And therefore, we discovered that in the rural setup, where most of the big companies cannot be able to be started there, this becomes their source of employment. So that is how we conceptualize the macro small and medium enterprises in Kenya, and by extension in Africa.

    Moses Ngoze 06:53

    Why is Africa not having large enterprises? We are depending on the foreign companies called multinationals coming to Africa. It’s because we have got this missing middle that can be able to grow into large enterprise.

    It was discovered that we have very few medium enterprises. And they account for only 14%. But we know that these particular firms need to grow from micro to small, to medium and into large enterprises. The missing middle are emanating because 1), the business ecosystem of Africa are what we are calling the business environment. But we don’ t have large market.

    And also they don’t have those equipment. Like if it’ s manufacturing firms, where do they get very big producing plants, like the machines? The machines we don’ t have. So they are still working? Like what in Asia we call cottage industries, the cottage industries. They’ re still working from home.

    And also the regulatory environment. Regulatory I mean, the government. Yeah, the government when they come in, they want to charge a lot of taxes.

    And basically, again, capital. And I’ll be able to talk a little bit about the microcredit. That’s where now the intervention of the microcredit comes in.

    Moses Ngoze: 08:34

    Now, how can we be able to support them? What are the ways of supporting these particular firms is through financial accessibility.

    Nowadays, we have seen the government is coming in with very, very many schemes. Like in Kenya, we have got the Micro Small and Enterprise Fund. We also have the Youth Enterprise Fund. We also have the Women Enterprise Fund.

    So what are we saying? We are saying that we need access to finance. However, the governments are really trying. And you also have doughnuts like the World Bank and the International Finance Corporation. We also have the British Council is also assisting so much. We also have the IMF, International Finance Corporation. And we also have the commercial banks. Although the commercial banks, the interest rate is quite variable.

    And at the moment, you understand that they are having a problem of the interest rate. And it’s not, Kenya is not exempted. The interest rate even goes as much as 35%. And yet you want to start per annum. So that’s quite, quite high.

    And we also have the venture capitalist. Although it’s still a new phenomenon in Kenya, we are happy to have a few venture capitalists who are giving out money.

    For these particular firms to thrive under Sustainable Development Goal number eight, the first thing is that these small enterprises, micro small and enterprises, should be looked at as an economic hub. That is economic-generating entities. That is, the government should be able to support them, and also their donors should be able to support them.

    Because if the whole world, we are talking of them being 90%. And they are providing 70% of the total employment, then it means that this particular sector ought to be supported, to generate employment, to generate income, to be centres of innovation, and hence, bring in what we call economic growth in Kenya.

    Well, how can the government come in? First of all the government should be able to provide a conducive environment for the growth of these particular firms? So how do they do that conducive environment?

    First of all, improve the infrastructure (like building of the roads). Improving the connectivity like internet, coming up with electricity, the electricity. They should also be able to reduce the taxes for these particular firms.

    And also try to support the initiative that is being brought in by institutions such as universities. And how do they do it in the universities? They should continue funding the university initiatives of trying to come up with the centres of enterprise development.

    Moses Ngoze: 11:58

    Nowadays, we have got the young generation who are now coming up in solutions in information, communication technology, the IT. Now the Silicon Savannah is now where we are saying is the Silicon Valley in America.

    We have the the venture capitalist, or people who can be able to provide finances, and those who have good ideas, they meet there.

    And then maybe I’ ve got money, you have an idea, we can be able to write a contract. And that particular contract binds us that we’ re going to start a firm. I’ m going to give you money, and the idea, we’re going to promote it like that.

    So in the country, in Nairobi, Nairobi is becoming so big, because we also in this particular idea, the young people are coming up with the mobile application, the internet applications.

    We are a powerhouse in East Africa. In fact, when you get, you get our Kenyan shilling is like a Sterling Pound, is like $1 Oh, yes, in all of Eastern Africa.

    And in terms of the countries that is growing very fast we are ranked, I think 4th Africa, after South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt.

    So, what we are seeing is that however much you cannot be able to achieve this eighth sustainable development goal, but then, when it comes to growth, we can say that Kenya is ranked highly. Of course, we look at our economy this particular year to grow by 6%. At the moment, we are still on 4.5%.

    But we are looking at this particular year to be very prospective 6%. And then also, what can the whole wild learn from Kenya? That’s a big question.

    Moses Ngoze: 14:04

    Although there are so many interventions that have been put in place, but still 2030 is just six years away, six years away.

    So we don’t take within six, six years apart, we can be able to fully, you know, achieve sustainable development goal number eight. And you don’ t know whether any catastrophe is going to come in, like the Corona COVID-19 came in and we did not know. The one that brought back the economy of the whole world.

    So I would say no, and by no, means that we don’t know about that particular future. And also given how the world economy is moving,

    Fabio Pulizzi: 15:07

    Thanks for listening to this series How to Save Humanity in 17 Goals.

    Join us again next time when we look at Sustainable Development Goal number nine on infrastructure, industrialization and innovation. See you then.

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  • Game theory shows we can never learn perfectly from our mistakes

    Game theory shows we can never learn perfectly from our mistakes

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    traders in stock market

    When people trade stocks, they don’t always learn from experience

    Bill Ross/Getty Images

    Even when we learn from past mistakes, we may never become optimal decision-makers. The finding comes from an analysis of a mathematical game that simulates a large economy, and suggests we may need to rethink some of the common assumptions built into existing economic theories.

    In such theories, people are typically represented as rational agents who learn from past experiences to optimise their performance, eventually reaching a stable state in which they know how to maximise their earnings. This assumption…

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