Space technology is bringing civil protection and defence closer together.
As geopolitical tensions rise and extreme weather events place increasing pressure on emergency services, the boundaries between civil protection and defence are becoming an important topic for the space and technology sectors. Technologies originally developed for civilian applications are increasingly relevant to defence, raising questions about how they can be adapted, funded and deployed responsibly.
In this interview, Guy Schumann, CEO and Founder of RSS-Hydro, discusses the growing overlap between civil protection and defence, exploring how Earth observation, satellite imagery, geospatial data and artificial intelligence can support disaster response and security operations.
Schumann explains why the operational needs of emergency responders and military personnel are often closely aligned, particularly when it comes to real-time intelligence, situational awareness and protecting critical infrastructure.
He also examines the challenges of adapting civilian technologies for dual-use applications, from cybersecurity requirements and restricted working environments to ethical considerations surrounding how technology may ultimately be used.
Looking ahead, Schumann considers whether closer collaboration and shared standards could accelerate innovation across both sectors, and why RSS-Hydro is assessing its position as defence investment continues to grow.
Why are more space and technology companies looking towards defence and dual-use applications?
I think there are two main reasons. Based on online posts and news over the past three years, some companies seem to be moving away from the civil protection applications they originally set out to develop and toward full-blown defence contracts. Others have always worked in this part of the sector and are now doing more of it.
Some companies have long had civil security and defence as a significant part of their budgets, revenues and contracts. Others may feel the need to respond to rising geopolitical tensions by directing their technology towards areas such as cybersecurity and defence.
Companies that originally focused on civil protection applications, such as using Earth observation for agriculture or environmental disasters, can often adapt their technologies or satellites for the defence sector. At RSS-Hydro, for example, our disaster-management solutions use technologies similar to those used in defence contracts.
Both sectors may need to address problems such as communications failing, finding alternative ways to communicate, or extracting specific information from large volumes of data. These are challenges we also work to solve. Our PIN approach, which I discussed in our previous interview, is another example of technology that could be used for civil security and defence.
Critical infrastructure also needs protection, whether from a natural disaster or a security incident. In many cases, the same solutions are needed. That is one reason companies are moving into this area. Another is that defence budgets are much larger, so companies may secure more or larger contracts for the same technology, satellite or imagery. Satellite providers have long sold imagery to the highest bidder across both defence and civil markets.
How closely are the needs of defence and disaster response aligned, particularly when it comes to real-time intelligence and situational awareness?
They are very closely aligned. The United States is a good example. The US Army has a mandate to protect the country against floods, while also having broader defence responsibilities. It is a clear example of technologies and needs that overlap.
In many European countries, these sectors are much more separate. Flood response is generally handled through civil budgets and civil protection, while defence has a separate budget. In the US, the response can be more integrated. If a hurricane hits a region, for example, defence capabilities may be used, including aircraft, search and rescue resources and the National Guard. When I worked in the US, I was in contact with these organisations.
In my own country, a major flood would not necessarily mean contacting the army. But the needs and technologies are very similar. The question is whether a government creates a divide between defence and disasters such as floods, fires and droughts, or recognises them as threats that can have comparable consequences for national security and society.
The impact, tragedy and recovery needs can be very similar. Ultimately, the degree of alignment often comes down to how budgets are organised and how the responsible organisations communicate at government level.
With defence spending and natural disasters both increasing, can you foresee a future where the budgets are combined, and would that be beneficial?
I think it could be beneficial. The contracts would still need to be clear, but the funding could come partly from defence budgets. If a country needs to respond to a major flood, for example, it may need to draw on the defence budget because that budget is larger.
That does not mean the contract for a company providing flood-management technology needs to be a defence contract. The funding could come from both civil and defence budgets, while the contract itself sets out the requirements. One important question is whether the technology must meet defence requirements or the cybersecurity requirements of the civil sector.
RSS-Hydro would be happy to take on a contract with civil-application requirements, including the relevant cybersecurity requirements, even if the funding came from two different budgets. It should be for the government to decide how the contract is funded. Our role is to explain what budget is needed to deliver the solution.
This kind of mix-and-match approach is often used in the US when a major hurricane has such a significant impact on lives and the economy that more funding is needed. In those cases, the defence budget can provide a substantial part of the funding.
RSS-Hydro’s technology was developed primarily for civil applications. What makes it naturally suited to civil security and public safety?
We have spent a lot of time understanding the requirements and needs of the people who use these technologies. Three things stand out: latency, clarity of information and confidence in that information. How quickly can we deliver clear information, and how confident can users be that it is reliable enough to support a decision?
Those needs are very similar for a military commander, whether in the army, air force or navy, and for someone leading civil protection or a firefighting team. The main difference may be the level of cybersecurity required. The underlying requirements and the technologies needed to meet them are often very similar.
Users need clear, near-real-time or real-time updates with a high level of confidence. We are developing technology to address those three requirements. That also makes the technology suitable for dual-use applications.
How can Earth observation, geospatial data and modelling help authorities respond more effectively to natural disasters and security incidents?
These technologies can support large-scale situational awareness, terrain mapping and the monitoring of environmental hazards. They can help authorities protect people and understand where and how often certain activities can be carried out safely, as well as where caution is needed.
Weather forecasts and meteorological data are important to both defence and civil applications. If you want to deploy a tank somewhere, you need to know whether a storm is coming. The same applies to other activities where weather conditions affect safety. The warning may be used by very different people, but both need to keep people safe.
That is the approach we take. We develop technology to protect people and help them stay safe.
Are there concerns about how defence organisations might use technology once it has been supplied to them?
The difficulty with defence is that you do not necessarily know what the end user will do with the technology supplied under a contract once that contract has ended. But that is their right.
The same uncertainty can apply to humanitarian organisations. We might provide a flood map to someone at the United Nations in Somalia, for example, but we do not know what happens to it afterwards or whether it could eventually reach the wrong people. The same could happen in Sudan or Europe. A map showing exactly where a wildfire is likely to spread could be used for the wrong reasons.
So disaster-management technology can potentially be misused, just as other information can.
If these technologies are used for both civil and defence purposes, do you think safeguards need to be put in place?
Yes. Safeguards are often dictated by defence requirements, and we could also help build them into the technology. The underlying technology might be the same, but the way it is delivered and supported may need to be different. That includes safeguards and cybersecurity, and potentially different requirements for machine learning and artificial intelligence.
One option is to develop solutions to defence requirements and standards from the outset, because those standards may also be suitable for the civil sector. Given the challenges around AI and other technologies in civil organisations, we may need to adopt more of the safeguards used in defence. That could make systems harder to hack and harder to misuse.
People are increasingly worried about what might happen if systems are compromised and organisations, including banks, are unable to respond. Defence has a strong focus on preventing cyberattacks because it handles sensitive information and systems that can be critical to saving lives. There may be useful safeguards to learn from that approach.
Would it be better to design technology with defence requirements in mind and then use it for other applications, rather than trying to cater to both sectors from the outset?
I think so, particularly for disaster-management solutions such as ours. Standards should be brought together across civil applications and defence because the underlying issues are sensitive in either case: responding to disasters, supporting vulnerable people, coordinating search and rescue, and deciding who to deploy and when during a flood or fire.
It should not matter whether the person being deployed is a soldier, a firefighter or a volunteer. We need to work towards common standards for disaster management and disaster-response solutions, rather than treating civil and defence standards as entirely separate. In that sense, I think we need dual-use standards.
How important are AI and real-time data processing in turning satellite data into actionable intelligence for defence and disaster response?
We use machine learning to interpret satellite data quickly and consistently across the globe for disaster applications. It helps us segment image data and turn it into maps showing where a disaster is occurring, as well as supporting monitoring and alerts.
We also structure the information we deliver so that it can be interpreted by large language models and other AI agents. These agents are increasingly being incorporated into decision-making platforms. A firefighter or battlefield commander might enter a question or instruction, and the agent will then interpret our data to help respond.
We therefore need to make sure the data is structured in a way that prevents AI from misinterpreting it. Clearer information is easier for people to understand and should also be less confusing for AI, which relies on clear patterns and structure.
We use machine learning to interpret satellite data and then structure the resulting intelligence so third-party agents can interpret it. Whether those agents are used on a defence platform or a disaster-management platform should be irrelevant to us.
From RSS-Hydro’s perspective, what are the biggest challenges in adapting civil technologies for dual use?
We are a small company, so my biggest concern about taking on defence contracts is not the technology itself, because we are developing the same kinds of solutions. The cybersecurity requirements would change, but there could also be significant changes to how the company operates.
For example, we might need a room that can be locked with a keypad, a secure laptop and a secure connection, with access restricted to people who have the necessary clearance. That could change how we work every day. Could we still have an open-plan office? Probably not, because some people might not be permitted to take part in that work.
These cybersecurity restrictions could have a direct impact on our day-to-day operations. As a small company, we cannot necessarily pivot quickly enough to meet all the conditions that may come with those contracts. That is my biggest concern.
With defence investment growing, could this strengthen capabilities for disaster response and monitoring as well as for defence?
Yes, but only if technology developed for defence can also be made available for civil protection applications. This is similar to the question of combining budgets: we should also be able to make the technology usable by both sectors.
That would help because there is valuable innovation in the civil sector that could be used for defence, and vice versa. Collaboration needs to happen. If it does, we can innovate faster and at lower cost.
Could a country be reluctant to make advanced defence technology available to the civil sector because other nations might then gain access to its defence technology?
Yes. The civil sector often works with open-access data and open-source technology, which makes moving technology from defence into civil applications more difficult.
Defence contracts, on the other hand, often use open-source data and code from the civil sector and incorporate them into a restricted pipeline. Moving technology in the other direction is more difficult because adding a defence element to a civil technology creates a risk that it could become more openly accessible than intended.
That risk could be managed through restrictions written into the contract for particular applications. But the risk is real and may be one of the main reasons this transfer does not happen more often.
The question is not whether defence technology can be used in the civil sector. It is whether we want it to be. That is not for me, as a company owner, to resolve. It is a political question that requires global collaboration.
Looking ahead, do you think we will increasingly see space technology designed from the outset for both civil and defence applications? Where does RSS-Hydro position itself in this?
We are currently drafting defence policies for the company. I think it is clear that we need to position ourselves more in this space, particularly over the next five years, as defence budgets and concerns continue to grow.
We work with satellites, drones and models in disaster management, so I think we need to step further into the dual-use space. But we need to approach this carefully, both for our team and in how we communicate externally. We need to decide which contracts we do not want to take on, which we are comfortable with, and which we actively want to pursue.
I suspect companies working in disaster management, Earth observation and civilian satellite technology are asking similar questions. Where should they position themselves in dual-use markets? Which contracts should they take on? Which research and development grants should they pursue? What do the contract and proposal actually say? If a project is clearly focused on attack, perhaps we do not want to be involved. But even then, the boundaries can be difficult to define. It is a complex issue.
