More than three years since a key US chemical plant security monitoring programme expired, the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) is urging the responsible agency to rapidly implement voluntary measures to support plant operators in assessing and countering terrorist security risks.
Before it lapsed in July 2023, the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) programme conducted inspections, risk assessments and offered security guidance to around 3200 US chemical plants that are classified as high-risk, based on the quantities of hazardous chemicals they handle. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), which administered the programme, also vetted employees and visitors for security risks.
CISA has said that without CFATS it can no longer conduct terrorist vetting on approximately 9000 people per month that access materials at these high-risk chemical facilities. The GAO report recommends that CISA ‘should identify, evaluate, and implement options for voluntary vetting, and seek appropriate legislative authority to do so.
But CISA’s parent body, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) disagrees. DHS argued that CFATS’ expiry means CISA can no longer require facilities to report their chemicals of interest, undergo CFATS inspections or implement site security plans.
‘DHS does not conduct any type of direct vetting of chemical facilities as it had in the past, and aside from traditional criminal background investigations…[it has] no similar option to vet individuals against the federal government’s terrorist watch list,’ Tina Won Sherman, who directs the GAO’s Homeland Security and Justice team, tells Chemistry World.
Dramatic workforce reductions
‘As soon as the programme lapsed, CISA lost the ability to identify where high-risk facilities are and what type of chemicals they have, and to be able to work with other agencies to address these vulnerabilities, including conducting formal inspections,’ she explains. ‘The agency was also no longer able to conduct personnel vetting or carry out enforcement actions,’ which had previously included fines and warnings to help incentivise a facility to address vulnerabilities, for example.
It is the intelligence community and the Department of Justice that operate the terrorist watch list, but DHS and CISA had used that information for screening purposes until CFATS expired. DHS does continue to monitor national security threats and share intelligence-related information.
Meanwhile, CISA’s staff available to directly support chemical sector activities was reduced from 214 to 52 between financial years 2024 and 2025, with others scheduled to leave by the end of 2025.
Chemical industry leaders have urged government action to renew CFATS ever since its expiry, and those calls continue. The American Chemistry Council, which represents US chemical companies, says CFATS provided chemical facilities with an ‘important security tool that companies cannot replicate on their own.’
Patrick Coyle, a US-based chemical safety and security specialist who writes a chemical facilities security blog, suggests that CISA could include a voluntary personnel vetting programme within its non-mandatory ChemLock programme, which offers plant owners and operators no-cost services and tools that address physical and cyber-related threats to help mitigate security risks. ‘This would almost certainly require additional funding and, at the very least, congressional direction to conduct voluntary [pre-employment] screening,’ Coyle says.
Another option, according to Coyle, is for chemical facilities to require prospective employees to obtain a Transportation Workers Identification Credential (TWIC). This is a federal identification card issued by the US Transportation Security Administration (TSA) for individuals requiring unescorted entry to secure facilities. He suggests that companies could reimburse the cost of such cards or Congress could direct TSA to allow companies to sponsor employees’ TWIC applications.
Sherman points out that there have been several (unsuccessful) legislative efforts to reauthorise CFATS. It could yet still be revived, but for now the programme’s fate remains uncertain.
